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ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE TIME OF

COVID: THE CHIEF PLAYS
CALVINBALL
TONJA JACOBI*, TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON**, EVE M. RINGSMUTH***, AND
MATTHEW SAG****

ABSTRACT
In this Article, we empirically assess the Supreme Court's experiment in
hearing telephonic oral arguments. We compare the telephonic hearings to
those heardin person by the current Courtand examine whether the Justices
followed norms offairness and equality. We show that the telephonicforum
changed the dynamics of oral argument in a way that gave the ChiefJustice
new power, and that ChiefJustice Roberts, knowingly or unknowingly, used
that new power to benefit his ideologicalallies. We also show that the Chief
interrupted the female Justices disproportionately more than the male
Justices and gave the male Justices more substantive opportunities to have
their questions answered.
This analysis transcends the significance of individual cases. The fact
that the Court experimented with telephonic oral argument, the way it did
so, and how the practice could be improved are all issues of profound
national importance. The new format had the potential to influence the
outcome of cases that have broad national significance, to shift norms of
equality and transparencyin the Court, and more generally to affect judicial
legitimacy. If the Courtfavors certainparties or certain ideological camps
by its choice offorum in a time of crisis, then that will undermine not only
the Court's legitimacy but also raisedoubts as to whether any of our national
institutions have the capacity to adapt to crises.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In May 2020, in response to the global coronavirus pandemic, the U.S.
Supreme Court heard oral argument via telephone conference in ten select
cases still pending in the October 2019 Term.' After initially delaying
2
hearing cases when it was unclear how long the pandemic would last, it soon
became apparent that the Court had to find a means of addressing at least
those cases that were most pressing-including those potentially affecting
the 2020 presidential election-and those with greatest legal and political
*
**
***
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Oklahoma State University.

**** Loyola University Chicago.
Media Advisory Regarding May Teleconference Argument Audio, SUP. CT. U.S. (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_04-30-20.
2 See infra Part I.B.

400

Southern CaliforniaInterdisciplinaryLaw Journal

[Vol. 30:399

significance. 3 When institutions around the world were switching to
and highly interactive peer-to-peer
technologically sophisticated
videoconferencing to carry out normal duties during a highly abnormal
time,4 the Supreme Court's choice to conduct oral argument over the
antiquated technology of the telephone was typically quaint for this slowmoving institution. And yet that choice constituted a radical change. The
seemingly modest shift to telephonic arguments and the decision to allow the
Justices to speak in order of seniority dramatically shifted power away from
the ideologically diverse Associate Justices toward the conservative Chief
Justice. This shift in power was the result of a decision by the Chief, not the
Court as a whole.6 In this Article, we show that Chief Justice Roberts
consistently employed his new power in a way that was highly unequal,
advantaging conservative allies and promoting his conservative agenda. We
also show that, in some respects, he used his discretion to advantage the male
Justices over the female Justices.
In the May telephonic hearings, the Court grappled with issues ran ing
from Congress's ability to subpoena the President's tax records, to
employers' religious rights under the First Amendment, and to states'
abilities to control presidential electors. 9 Those cases were important, but the
institutional change those hearings represented may be more important: how
institutions respond to moments of crisis reveals society's core values and
priorities, and shapes our identity going forward. Put simply, whether and
how public institutions continue to function in a crisis, such as the current
pandemic, is both revelatory and constitutive of our national identity. The
telephonic oral arguments are worthy of study as an exemplar of how a vital
institution of government adapted to what may be an ongoing crisis.
' The majority (twenty) of the cases still pending at the outbreak ofthe pandemic were held over until
the next Term. The cases selected for telephonic hearings were widely regarded as among the most
important. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Supreme Court Will Hear Arguments by Phone. The Public Can

Listen In, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/13/us/politics/supreme-courtphone-arguments-virus.html (describing the ten cases chosen for the telephonic forum of the thirty that
remained pending as "includ[ing] most of the major ones."). For specifics on individual cases, see infra
notes 7-9.
4 Zoom has become the standard-bearer of remote working. See, e.g., Jordan Novet, Why Zoom has

Become the DarlingofRemote Workers During the COVID-19 Crisis, CNBC (Mar. 21,2020, 12:17 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/21 /why-zoom-has-become-darling-of-remote-workers-amid-covid-9outbreak.html; Supantha Mukherjee & Akanksha Rana, Zoom Takes Lead over Microsoft Teams as Virus
Keeps Americans at Home: Apptopia, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2020 11:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-health-coronavirus-zoom-idUSKBN21I3AB. This includes courts, such as the Texas Supreme
Court. Marcia Coyle, 'Zooming' on Oral Argument Alternatives, NAT'L L. J.: SUP. CT. BRIEF (Apr. 8,
2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.law.com/supremecourtbrief/2020/04/08/12-firms-2I-companies-and-one(reporting
lead-counsel-will-the-court-embrace-video-abortion-and-covid-I9-on-the-courts-doorstep
that the Texas Supreme Court is using videoconferencing and querying why the Supreme Court Justices
cannot adapt to do the same).

5See Improvement in Telegraphy, U.S. Patent No. 174,465 (issued March 7, 1876).

6 Joan Biskupic, Behind Closed Doors During One of John Roberts'Most Surprising Years on the
Supreme Court, CNN (July 27, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/27/politics/john-roberts-supremecourt-liberals-daca-second-amendment/index.html (reporting that the Chief unilaterally decided on the
forum and rules of the telephonic oral argument, over some objections of the other Justices).

7 Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020); Trump v. vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).
8 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020); Our
Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
9 Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020); Colorado Dep't of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316
(2020).
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Moreover, given the significance of Supreme Court decisions in the run up
to the 2020 election, any suggestion that Chief Justice Roberts was tilting the
playing field in favor of Republicans raises questions about the Court's
legitimacy and adds weight to calls for institutional reform at the Supreme
Court.' 0 Our empirical analysis demonstrates that, knowingly or otherwise,
Chief Justice John Roberts did not use his newfound power in a neutral or
evenhanded fashion, and that, contrary to recent commentary, he is certainly
not becoming a moderate" or betraying conservatives."
In particular, the telephonic oral arguments were less interactive than the
in-person oral arguments, which stymied the ability of the Associate Justices
to influence the direction of the arguments, while the Chief Justice gained
power. The conservative Justices were the beneficiaries of the new format
and discretion exercised by the Chief on a number of different measures:
They had more words, spoke for longer, and generally gained influence at
the cost of the liberal Justices. There were also significant gender effects
from the Chief's discretion to terminate individual Justices' turns at
speaking-he interrupted female Justices' dialogues with the advocates
significantly more than those of the male Justices, as well as
disproportionately interrupting the female Justices themselves, and gave the
male Justices more opportunity to pursue their questions to fruition. Overall,
despite the seemingly equal formal structure of the Justices speaking in order
of seniority at the telephonic arguments, Chief Justice Roberts varied how
he treated each Justice's opportunity to be heard, advantaging his allies and
disadvantaging his ideological opponents and the female Justices.
The influence of political ideology on the Supreme Court has been wellestablished," and the oral argument phase is no exception: research shows
that as Justices seek information and engage in pre-conference discussion
with their colleagues, they do so in ways designed to serve policy goals."
The vast majority of these studies, however, focus on the extent to which
each individual Justice is influenced by their own political ideology; '" in
10 See infra Concusion.

" E.g., Curt Levey, John Roberts Has Gone FullAnthony Kennedy, WASH. POST (July 1, 2020, 6:06
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/john-roberts-has-gone-full-anthony-kennedy/2020/07/
01/3640fd6a-bbdd-11ea-bdaf-a129f921026f story.html (arguing Roberts is, to conservatives, "following
in the disappointingly centrist footsteps of previous swing Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.").
12

See infra Conclusion.

13 From grants of certiorari, see, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher J. W. Zorn,

Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 550 (1999)
(showing that Justices vote to hear cases more frequently in which their preferred litigant or outcome
ultimately wins), to Justices' votes in case outcomes, JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (documenting the "attitudinal model" whereby
ideology predicts Supreme Court cases), and opinion writing, see, e.g., Forest Maltzman & Paul J.
Wahlbeck, A ConditionalModel of'Opinion Assignment on the Supreme Court, 57 POL. RSCH. Q. 551,
561 (2004) (establishing that "Chief Justices are more likely to assign majority opinions to those Justices
with whom they are ideologically aligned, but also take into consideration the organizational needs of the
Court"), and coalition formation, see infra Part I.A.
' See discussion infra text accompanying note 39.
" But note the "panel effects" literature, showing that the ideology of other Justices on a bench also
influences judicial behavior. See generally Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, JudicialPartisanship
andObedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the FederalCourts ofAppeals, 107 YALE L. J. 2155
(1998) (examining the effect of having a potential dissenting voice with a contrary ideological preference
on the majority); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigationof 'Chevron', 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 827 (2006) (estimating the effect of the composition
of appellate panels in applying Chevron deference).
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contrast, this Article illustrates that the Chief Justice was able to manipulate
the institutional forum itself to advantage one political side over another, to
hobble the influence of the liberal Justices, and to promote the influence of
the conservative Justices.' 6 This finding suggests that Chief Justice Roberts
is not a neutral umpire simply "call[ing] balls and strikes," as he claimed he
would be;'" rather, he is making up different rules that apply differently to
different Justices according to his ideological affinity with them. In the
telephonic cases, the Chief was playing "Calvinball," altering the rules as he
went along.'8
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides background to the
inquiry, first by introducing the literature showing the importance of oral
argument in the Court's decision-making process, which illustrates the
significance of examining the effect of the switch to the telephonic forum. It
then describes the switch to telephonic oral argument, including the changing
role of the Chief Justice. Part II describes our data and methods; the new
telephonic context requires novel concepts of understanding judicial
behavior at oral argument. We develop new tools for empirically analyzing
oral argument and show how utilizing these concepts allows us to answer
bigger questions than would otherwise be possible. Part III provides our
empirical analysis of the telephonic cases, comparing them to the in-person
cases since Justice Brett Kavanaugh was seated in October 2018.'9 It shows
that, despite the seemingly formal equality of the telephonic forum, the
arguments were marked by significant inequality among the Justices,
imposed in large part by the Chief Justice's choice of when to cut off the
Associate Justices' dialogue with the advocates. We show that this inequality
was not random. Indeed, the telephonic format and the Chief's influence
during it consistently advantaged his conservative allies on the Court to the
disadvantage of the liberal Justices, and advantaged the male Justices to the
disadvantage of the female Justices. The Chief applied different rules to
different Justices and to different topics.
We conclude by addressing two important questions raised by our
results. First, we analyze whether Chief Justice Roberts's seeming
preferencing of the conservative Justices' agenda is at odds with his recent
decisions favoring some liberal causes. We argue that it is not: the Chief is a
highly strategic actor playing a long game in a context where the Court's

&

16 Another study showing that changing an aspect of the structure of oral argument- -albeit not an
ideological shift-changes judicial behavior at oral argument is Ryan C. Black, Timothy R. Johnson
Ryan J. Owens, ChiefJustice Burger and the Bench: How Physically Changing the Shape of the Court's
Bench Reduced Interruptionsduring OralArgument, 43 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 83, 83-98 (2018) (showing that
the shift from the Justices hearing oral argument at a straight bench to a curved bench changed judicial
interactions because the justices could see one another).
17 Roberts:

'My Job Is to CallBalls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat', CNN.coM (Sept. 12, 2005,

4:58 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement.
1 "Calvinball has no rules; the players make up their own rules as they go along .... There [is] only
one permanent rule in Calvinball: players cannot play it the same way twice." Calvinball, FANDOM:
CALVIN & HOBBES wIKI, https://calvinandhobbes.fandom.com/wiki/Calvinball (last visited Aug. 1,
2020). We got the idea for this contrast from a Northwestern student, Samuel Young, who used it as a
comparison between baseball and Calvinball as applied to the Court in general in a term paper.
19 I.e., those cases heard between October 9, 2018 and March 4, 2020.
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legitimacy is fragile.20 Second, we provide some practical direction for how
the Court should move forward. A return to normalcy in time for the Supreme
Court to resume its regular sittings in October 2021 is uncertain.2 1 Even
assuming the best, if the end of the COVID crisis is on the horizon, the
pandemic vividly demonstrates the need to address the fragility of key
aspects of our social, political, and economic infrastructure.22 The Supreme
Court should, right now, be making contingency plans for future challenges,
such as extreme weather events, terrorist attacks, civil unrest, and other
pandemics. In a time of fracturing institutional norms and deep political
polarization, reliance on the goodwill and presumed neutrality of the Chief
is perhaps unwise. We suggest how the Court can do better than telephonic
oral arguments.
II.

BACKGROUND: ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE ROBERTS COURT
A.

Oral Argument

The U.S. Supreme Court normally sits for oral arguments between the
first Monday in October and the last week in April. 23 At precisely 10 o'clock
on argument days, the Justices enter the Courtroom through the red velvet
curtains behind the bench. After other business is finished (e.g., orders issued
and new members of the bar sworn in), the Chief Justice calls the first case
and the petitioner's attorney moves to the lectern and begins their argument
with the ubiquitous, "Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court." These
procedures have been status quo for at least as long as the Court has recorded
its oral arguments, beginning in the 1955 Term.24 They encapsulate the
stability and normalcy of the nation's highest Court. Like almost every other
aspect of American life, this stability and normalcy was disrupted by the
COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. A brief overview of the academic
25 For other evidence of Chief Justice Roberts as a strategic player promoting a generally conservative
agenda, see Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80 TENN. L. REV. 763 (2013)
(arguing that every major section of the Chief's opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius was a strategic attempt to
maximize conservative goals within the constraint of promoting the legitimacy of the Court in a highly
salient and political case).
21 As of May 9, 2021, the CDC COVID-19 tracker in the United States records 32,481,455 total cases

&

and 578,520 confirmed deaths, with 84.6 cases per 100,000 people in the week prior. COVID Data
Thacker: United States COVID-19 Cases and Deaths by State, CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
PREVENTION, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases casesper100klast7days (last visited May
9, 2021). Daily new case numbers have been decreasing. COVID Data Tracker: Trends in Number of

COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in the US Reported to CDC, by State/Territory, CTRS FOR DISEASE

(last
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trendstotalandratecases
visited May 9, 2021) [hereinafter Thends in Number of COVID-19 Cases].Although the United States has
made great strides in controlling COVID numbers in recent months and has had success with the vaccine
rollout, scientists warn that the significant surge in other regions could lead to a resurgence in the United
States. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, India's Outbreak is a Danger to the World. Here's Why., N.Y. TIMES
(May 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/02/world/india-covid-variants.html ("Experts say
uncontrolled outbreaks like India's also threaten to prolong the pandemic by allowing more dangerous
virus variants to mutate, spread and possibly evade vaccines.").
22 For example, keeping local governments and the judicial system running, ensuring the social
security system is working, and maintaining the health care infrastructure.
23 Note that Supreme Court Terms typically begin in October and end in April and are referred to by
the year in which they commenced. Thus the 2019 Term began in October 2019 and concluded in May

2020.
24 See generally Argument Transcripts, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument transcript/2019 (last visited Aug. 1, 2020).
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literature on oral argument is required to understand the significance of this
disruption and of the Court's adoption of telephonic oral argument.
Although journalists and academics pay close attention to individual
hearings before the Supreme Court, oral argument as an institution was
relatively understudied until recently.25 But in the past quarter century, the
literature has demonstrated that, even as the amount of time devoted to oral
argument has decreased, oral argument remains central to the business of the
Court. 26 By way of overview, it shows that oral argument is an important
source of information for the Justices, 2 7 and that it also serves a "preconference" role as a forum in which the Justices can learn about each other's
views and begin attempts at persuasion and coalition formation. 28 In
addition, the literature establishes that, even if we disregard the content of
what the Justices say, their behavior at oral argument reveals a great deal
about their voting intentions. 29 The literature also situates oral argument in a
broader social context: the increasing trend toward judicial advocacy in oral
argument has been linked to broader trends in political polarization in
American society, and the notably higher rate at which female Justices are
interrupted reflects still unresolved issues of gender in the rest of society. 30
Finally, oral argument is the only public aspect of the Supreme Court's
decision-making process prior to the announcement of the decisions
themselves. As such, the institution of oral argument allows the Court to
demonstrate its adherence to fundamental Rule of Law values.3 1
1. Information and Persuasion
Supreme Court oral argument is laden with tradition, symbolism, and
formality, but that overlay of public spectacle should not obscure the fact that
oral argument serves an integral function to the judicial decision-making
process. The Justices have access to a substantial amount of information in
the form of litigant and amicus briefs. These briefs inform the Justices about
the legal merits of various arguments and the policy and strategic
implications of potential outcomes. 32 However, the Justices are passive

.

25 Early accounts of these proceedings include: Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The
Supreme Court, theAdversary System, andthe Flow ofinformation to the Justices:A PreliminaryInquiry,
61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1187-1245 (1975); E. Barret Prettyman, Jr., The Supreme Court's Use of
Hypothetical Questions at Oral Argument, 33 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 555, 555-91 (1984); James N.
Schubert, Steven Peterson, Glendon A. Schubert & Stephen L. Wasby, Observing Supreme Court Oral
A BiosocialApproach, 11 POL. & LIFE SCI. 35, 35-51 (1992).
Argument:
26
See infra Part IAl.
27 See infra Part I.A.
28
29

See infra Part I.A.2.
See infra Part I.A.3.

30 See infra Part I.A.4.
31 See infra Part LA.4.
32 E.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr., Lobbyists Before the US. Supreme Court: Investigating the Influence of
Amicus CuriaeBriefs, 60 POL. RSCH. Q. 55, 63 (2007) (showing that amicus curiae briefs influence the
ideological direction of the Court's decisions); Pamela C. Corley, The Supreme Court and Opinion
Content: The Influence of Parties'Briefs, 61 POL. RSCH. Q. 468, 476-77 (2008) (showing that the
language used in the parties' briefs shapes the language of Supreme Court opinions contingent on factors
such as the quality of the brief, the brief's ideological compatibility with the Court, and the political
salience of the case).
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recipients of this information-they do not directly control what the parties
include in their briefs.
Oral argument is different: in oral argument, the Justices actively seek
out information that they deem relevant to their decision-making task.3 3 The
Justices use oral argument to resolve factual ambiguities, to explore the
merits of grand ideas and specific legal tests, and to ferret out the policy
implications of their potential rulings. As Justice Harlan put it, "There is no
substitute . .. for the Socratic method of procedure in getting at the real heart
of an issue and in finding out where the truth lies." 5 Even though many
Supreme Court decisions may seem inevitable ex post, empirical studies
suggest that advocate quality and experience in oral argument affect how the
Justices vote. 36 One explanation of what makes more experienced attorneys
more persuasive, at least in part, is that they are better able to reduce the costs
that Justices must pay when obtaining information. 37 That is, the information
role of oral argument is important to the Justices, and they value the role of
good advocates in facilitating that information gathering.
2. Pre-Conference
In addition to gathering information, a substantial literature confirms that
Justices use oral arguments as a kind of "pre-conference." 38 Indeed, Justices
use oral argument to learn about each other's preferences, to try to alter each
3 TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 12-13 (2004) (arguing that Justices use oral arguments to direct the content of the
information they obtain when making decisions); Eve M. Ringsmuth & Timothy R. Johnson, Supreme
Court Oral Arguments and InstitutionalMaintenance,41 AM. POL. RSCH., 651, 662 (2013) (showing that
the Court uses oral arguments as an opportunity to solicit information about Congress and its members,
particularly when its legitimacy may be in peril). Information-seeking is the stated purpose of oral
arguments. OralArguments, SUP. CT. U.S., www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments (last visited Apr. 29,
2021) (describing oral arguments as "an opportunity for the Justices to ask questions directly of the
attorneys representing the parties to the case, and for the attorneys to highlight arguments that they view
as particularly important.").
4 JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 45. Miller & Barron, supra note 25, at 1187-1245; See Prettyman,
supra note 25, at 555-91. Moreover, former Justices agree with these scholarly assessments. For instance,
Justice John Harlan argued that "oral argument gives an opportunity for interchange between Court and
counsel" to engage in a joint effort to "search out the truth, both as to the facts and the law." John M.
Harlan, What PartDoes the Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an Appeal?, 41 CORNELL L. Q. 6, 7
(1955). Chief Justice Rehnquist posited that oral arguments allow Justices to evaluate counsel's "strong
and [] weak points, and to ask . . . some questions [about the case]." William H. Rehnquist, Oral

Advocacy: A DisappearingArt, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1015, 1025 (1984); Barry Sullivan & Megan Canty,
Interruptionsin Search of a Purpose: OralArgument in the Supreme Court, October Terms 1958-60 and
2010-12, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1005, 1028 (suggesting that Justices speak more during oral argument
because they now only get one chance to speak during the post-conference, as opposed to two times in
the earlier Terms, and so talk to each other at oral argument instead); DAVID C. FREDERICK, SUPREME
COURT AND APPELLATE ADVOCACY: MASTERING ORAL ARGUMENT 5-6 (2003) (claiming that oral
arguments provide opportunity for conversation between Justices that conferences do not).
35 Harlan, supra note 34, at 7.
36 Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs, II, The Influence of OralArgumentation
Before the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 107, 109 (2006) (showing that attorneys with
greater experience are more likely to present high quality oral argument and that the relative quality of
oral argument influences the Justices' vote choices); Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs & Paul J.
Wahlbeck, Oral Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court: Does it Affect the Justices'
Decisions? 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 457, 495 (2007) (showing that Justices' votes are responsive to the
quality of oral argument and that the responsiveness changes depending on the salience of the case).
3 See Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 89 AM. POL.

SCI. REV. 691, 691-702 (1995).
3 Sullivan & Canty, supra note 34, at 1027 (describing oral argument as increasingly "an opportunity
for the Justices to persuade each other"); FREDERICK, supranote 34, at 5-6 (claiming that oral arguments
provide opportunity for conversation between Justices that conferences do not).
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other's view of a case, and to engage in preliminary negotiations about the
final decision. 39 The pre-conference role of oral argument is apparent from
the archival papers of Justice Lewis F. Powell and Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, which indicate that those two Justices listened to their colleagues'
comments with an ear towards determining how coalitions might form and
particularly how their ideological allies and opponents might vote.4
Comments from the Justices over the years also confirm this role of oral
argument. For instance, Justice Anthony Kennedy commented, "[During oral
arguments] the Court is having a conversation with itself through the
intermediary of the attorney."41 Additionally, Justice Antonin Scalia noted,
"It isn't just an interchange between-between counsel and each of the
individual Justices .. .. What is going on is also to some extent an exchange
of information among the Justices themselves." 4 2
The pre-conference function of oral argument is openly discussed by
members of the current Supreme Court. In Chief Justice Roberts's words,
"[W]hen we get on the bench it's really the first time we get some clues about
what our colleagues think. So we often are using questions to bring out points
that we think our colleagues ought to know about."43 Justice Sonia
Sotomayor argued that one purpose of oral argument "is for judges to hear
what's bothering each other.' 4 Justice Elena Kagan echoed this view:
"There's no doubt . .. that part of what oral argument is about is a little bit
of the justices talking to each other with some helpless person standing at the
podium who you're talking through."45 The Justices also intervene in oral
argument when they think that the argument is proceeding down the wrong
path in an effort to keep their colleagues focused on the issues they deem
most likely to produce the "correct" outcome.4 6
As such, oral argument is now, and has been for some time, an important
part of the Court's process that plays not only a direct role in providing
information to the Justices, but also an indirect role in shaping the decisionmaking of the Court as a group, enabling the Justices to influence one another
39 Stephen L. Washy, Anthony A. D'Amato & Rosemary Metrailer, The Functions of Oral Argument
in the U.S. Supreme Court, 62 Q. J. SPEECH 410, 410-22 (1976) (showing, anecdotally, that Justices speak
to one another during these proceedings); RYAN C. BLACK, TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON & JUSTIN WEDEKING,
ORAL ARGUMENTS AND COALITION FORMATION ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A DELIBERATE
DIALOGUE 20-21 (2012) (demonstrating how Justices specifically interact with one another during
argument sessions, including interrupting one another (chapter 2) and listening to what other Justices say

(chapter 3)).
40 JOHNSON, supra note 33; BLACK, JOHNSON & WEDEKING, supra note 39.
41 Supreme Court Visitors Film (C-SPAN television broadcast Feb. 16, 1998), https://www.c-

span.org/video/?l 00767-1/supreme-court-visitors-film.
42 Upcoming PBS Program on the Supreme Court (C-SPAN television broadcast May 5, 1988),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?2514-I/upcoming-pbs-program-supreme-court
(discussing PBS Special,
The Honorable Court).

43 Id.

44

Adam Liptak, Sotomayor Reflects on First Years on Court, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2011),

https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/us/politics/01 sotomayor.html. Justice Sotomayor suggests that this
process also influences her in the subsequent conference, since "she tailors her own reasoning [during
conference] to take account of what she has heard from her colleagues at arguments." Id.

45 Adam Liptak, A Most Inquisitive Court? No Argument There, N.Y, TIMES (Oct. 7, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/us/inquisitive-justices-no-argument-there.html.
46 See Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, The New Oral Argument: Justices as Advocates, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1161, 1176 (2019) (quoting Justice Alito).
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and form coalitions. To the extent that the telephonic forum has changed the
nature of that interaction by disabling the dynamic nature of the Justices'
interchanges with one another and the advocates, 47 it could alter the judicial
decision-making process itself.
3. Prediction
Empirical studies have shown that case outcomes and the votes of
individual Justices can be predicted based on judicial behavior at oral
argument.4 8 A number of forms of judicial behavior can be used to predict
case outcomes before the Justices have even met at conference. For instance,
several studies have shown that the Justices have more to say to the party
they end up voting against 4 9 -a result that holds whether it is based on word
counts, speech turns, or even just comments that adduce laughter from the
gallery. These predictive models have become so reliable that scholars have
been able to apply them to other contexts, such as the Australian High Court,
where the same "disagreement gap" arises."
Furthermore, studies have shown not only how an individual Justice will
vote, but also the likely interaction between the Justices, based on their
behavior toward one another at oral argument. For instance, inter-justice
conflict at oral argument in the form of interruptions is predictive of future
breakdowns in voting agreement.52 Similarly, the emotional content of the
Justices' words at oral argument can be used to predict voting behavior. 53
With lives hinging on death penalty determinations and markets ready to
fluctuate with the adjudication of valuable intellectual property and tax
4 See

infra Part IV.A.
Timothy R. Johnson, Ryan Black, Jerry Goldman & Sarah Treul, InquiringMinds Want to Know:
Do Justices Tip Their Hands with Questions at OralArgument in the US. Supreme Court?,29 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 241, 256 (2009) (showing that the side that receives more attention from the Justices during

4

oral argument is more likely to lose the case).
49 The first studies to reach this conclusion were based on very small sample sizes. In a study often
oral arguments in the October 2002 Term, Shullman noted, among other things, that the Justices generally
ask more questions (helpful or hostile) of litigants who went on to lose. Sarah Levien Shullman, The
Illusion of Devil'sAdvocacy: How the Justicesof the Supreme Court ForeshadowTheir Decisions During
Oral Argument, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 271, 273 (2004). In 2005, John Roberts (who was then a
regular Supreme Court advocate) found that 86% of the time the party receiving the most inquiries from
the bench ultimately lost the case in a study of twenty-eight cases. John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy
and the Re-emergence of a Supreme CourtBar, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 75 (2005). In 2009, Johnson et
al. found the same result in a larger more rigorous study. Johnson et al., supra note 48, at 241-61. In a
2017 study of every Supreme Court oral argument from the 1960 to 2015 Terms, Jacobi and Sag found
that not only do the Justices speak more to the advocates whom they ultimately rule against, but that this
"disagreement gap" had been increasing since the mid-1990s. Jacobi & Sag, supra note 46, at 1226-27.
so Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking LaughterSeriously at the Supreme Court, 72 VAND. L. REV.

1423, 1426 (2019).
51 Tonja Jacobi, Zoe Robinson & Patrick Leslie, Comparative Oral Argument: What Australia Can
Teach Us About the U.S. Supreme Court (and Vice-Versa) (Nw. Univ., Working Paper 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (concluding that the Australian Justices are more active when in
opposition to a dominant ideological regime or when facing a likely failure to convince their colleagues
in the case at hand).
52 Tonja Jacobi & Kyle Rozema, Judicial Conflicts and Voting Agreement: Evidence from

Interruptions at Oral Argument, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2259, 2260, 2263-64, 2294-95 (2018).
5 Ryan C. Black, Sarah A. Treul, Timothy R. Johnson & Jerry Goldman, Emotions, Oral Arguments,
and Supreme CourtDecision Making, 73 J. POL. 572, 577 (2011) (showing that the side that receives a
higher proportion of negative language from the Justices during oral argument is more likely to lose on
the merits); see also Bryce J. Dietrich et al., Emotional Arousal Predicts Voting on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 27 POL. ANALYSIS 237 (2018) (showing emotional arousal in the Justices' voices provides
information about subsequent votes).
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cases, 54 Court observers closely scrutinize everything for any hint of what
will be the likely outcome in a given case, from judicial speeches" to judicial
health scares 56 to potential recusals. 57 Consequently, it is important to
anticipate any change to the institutional form of oral argument that might
lead to meaningful shifts in voting patterns.
Oral Argument Reflects Broader Social Forces and Shapes the Court's
Legitimacy
Oral argument at the Supreme Court has a remarkably stable formal
structure. There have only been minimal changes to the process since 1955:
a gradual reduction in the length of time devoted to oral argument, 58 and the
introduction of the uninterrupted two-minute period for each primary
advocate, known as the "two minute rule," introduced in the 2019 Term.
Nevertheless, empirical studies have shown that despite this stable form, oral
argument at the Supreme Court has changed quite significantly in the last
few decades. Tonja Jacobi and Matthew Sag demonstrated that judicial
activity during oral argument has increased significantly since the 1960s, in
the sense that "[J]ustices in the modern era interrupt more, speak more, and

4.

4 For example, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 140
S. Ct. 520 (2019) (No. 18-956), held over until the 2020 Term, is estimated to be worth $9 billion and has
been described as the "Copyright Case of the Decade." See, e.g., Roger Parloff, Google and Oracle s $9
Billion 'Copyright Case of the Decade'Could be Headedfor the Supreme Court, NEWSWEEK (May 23,

2019, 4:10 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/2019/06/07/google-oracle-copyright-case-supreme-court1433037.html.
5 See Bill Kenworthy, Judicial Campaign Speech, FREEDOM F. INST., https://www.freedomforum
institute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/campaign-finance-overview/judicialhttps://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-ofcampaign-speech
speech-2/campaign-finance-overview/judicial-campaign-speech/(last updated Feb. 2007) (describing the
dilemma between, on one hand, promoting public confidence in an impartial judiciary through preventing
judges from pre-committing to positions in cases via judicial speeches, and, on the other hand, freedom
of speech being essential to democracy).
56 See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, Ginsburg Health Scare Raises Prospect of Election Year Supreme
Court Battle, HILL (Nov. 30, 2019, 12:10 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/472354-ginsburg("The recent hospitalization of
health-scare-raises-prospect-of-election-year-supreme-court-battle
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg following a year of health scares has raised the prospect of a Supreme Court
vacancy in an election year and a partisan battle royal that would likely surpass the impeachment fight.");
Adam Liptak, Denise Grady & Carl Hulse, Ginsburg Says Her Cancer Has Returned, but She s 'Fully
Able' to Remain on the Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/07/17/us/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-cancer.html ("Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the most
prominent member of the Supreme Court's liberal minority, said Friday that she has had a recurrence of
cancer, causing a wave of anxiety among Democrats that was not completely assuaged by her assurance
that she was undergoing chemotherapy, with 'positive results,' and would remain on the Supreme
Court.").
5 See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L. J. 657, 659 (2004)
(detailing the intense public interest in whether Justice Scalia would recuse himself after going duck
hunting with then Vice President Dick Cheney while a lawsuit against Cheney was pending before the
Supreme Court, and Justice Scalia's various defenses of his decision not to do so).
58 Now, since 1970, oral argument is one hour, with each side ordinarily permitted thirty minutes.
SUP. CT. R. 28(3) ("Unless the Court directs otherwise, each side is allowed one-half hour for
argument .... Additional time is rarely accorded."). From 1925 until 1970, oral argument was generally
allotted two hours: one hour per side. See CLARE CUSHMAN, COURTWATCHERS: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS
IN SUPREME COURT HISTORY 126 (2011). From 1911 to 1925, each side was permitted one and a half
hours. SUP. CT. R. 22(3), (1911) (repealed 1925). Prior to 1911, each side was permitted two hours, or

more by special leave of the Court. SUP. CT. R. 26(4), 266 U.S. 653 (1925) (repealed 1928). And before
1849, arguments were unlimited in duration. SUP. CT. R. 53, 48 U.S. v (1849) (repealed 1858).
9 See discussion infra note 79.
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leave far less time for the advocates to present their case." 60 Their data
suggests that this increase in activity hit an inflection point in the mid-1990s,
supporting their thesis that increasing judicial advocacy was a byproduct of
a sharp increase in political polarization that massively escalated at that
time.6 This suggests that Supreme Court oral argument reflects changes in
other political institutions, such as Congress, as well as in changing public
attitudes.
In addition, numerous scholars have shown the influence of public
opinion on the Supreme Court, indicating that influence flows in both
directions: to and from the Court and the public. 62 And Supreme Court
hearings reflect broader societal trends in other, more amorphous cultural
ways. As Jacobi and Dylan Schweers demonstrated in their landmark study
of interruptions at oral argument, even at the apex of the legal establishment,
gender appears to play a role in judicial behavior and interactions. 63 Jacobi
and Schweers showed that between 2004 and 2015, female Supreme Court
Justices were consistently interrupted more often than male Justices-up to
three times as often in some Terms6-mirroring gender roles in other parts
of society. 65
As such, the Supreme Court is influenced by and, therefore, reflects the
broader political environment, including public opinion. Even more
important than public opinion is the institutionally vital element of public
esteem for the Court as an institution. 66 Oral argument is central in that regard
because it is the one part of the Supreme Court's decision-making process
that is in any way public or transparent. Every other aspect of that process is
* Jacobi & Sag, supra note 46, at 1163.

61

Id. at 1203, 1205, 1211.

Amanda C. Bryan, Public Opinion and Setting the Agenda on the U.S. Supreme Court, 48 AM.
POL. RSCH. 377, 383 (2020) (showing that public opinion influences Justices' certiorari votes); Amanda
C. Bryan & Christopher D. Kromphardt, Public Opinion, Public Support, and Counter-AttitudinalVoting
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 37 JUST. SYS. J. 298, 311 (2016) (showing that Justices will vote against their
preferred outcomes if public support for the Court is low).
62

63

Tonja Jacobi & Dylan Schweers, Justice, Interrupted: The Effect of Gender; Ideology, and Seniority

at Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 103 VA. L. REv. 1379, 1460 (2017) (showing even at the Supreme
Court, men interruptmore than women and men particularly interruptwomen); see also Adam Feldman
& Rebecca Gill, PowerDynamics in Supreme Court Oral Arguments: The Relationships Between Gender
andJustice-to-JusticeInterruptions,40 JUST. SYS. J. 173, 173 (2019) (showing women Justices are more
likely to be interrupted than their male colleagues); Dana Patton & Joseph L. Smith, Lawyer Interrupted:
Gender Bias in OralArguments at the US Supreme Court, 5 J. L. & CTS. 337, 338 (2017) (showing gender
disparities in advocate behavior at Supreme Court oral argument).
6 Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 63, at 1437. They made the same findings looking at individual
Terms 1990 and 2002. Id. at 1462-63. Jacobi & Sag extended the analysis, showing that the same pattern
held from 1998 through the 2018 Term. Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Justice-to-Justice Interruptions:
Gender Versus Ideology?, SCOTUS OA (Aug. 3, 2018), https://scotusoa.com/justice-to-justiceinterruptions-gender-versus-ideology; Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Can Supreme Court Culture
Change? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); see also Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, October
2018 Term in Review Part III (Interruptions), SCOTUS OA (May, 14, 2019),
https://scotusoa.com/2018term-interruptions.
65 See, e.g., Don H. Zimmerman & Candace West, Sex Roles, Interruptions and Silences in
Conversations, in LANGUAGE AND SEX: DIFFERENCE AND DOMINANCE 105, 116 (Barrie Thome & Nancy
Henley eds., 1975) (studying public conversations between mixed-gendered groups and finding that men
were responsible for forty-six of forty-eight interruptions); Lyn Kathlene, Power and Influence in State
Legislative Policymaking: The Interaction of Gender and Position in Committee Hearing Debates, 88
AM. POL. SC. REv. 560, 565, 573 (1994) (showing men disproportionately interrupt women in the state
legislative arena).
66 See, e.g., James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, MeasuringAttitudes
Towardthe UnitedStates Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 356 (2003) (explaining the importance
of institutional loyalty to the Supreme Court).
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opaque: the Justices select the cases, and they hear, deliberate, and write their
opinions on them in secret. 67 The public spectacle of oral argument is vital
to the legitimacy of the Court: it assures the parties in the case at hand that
their arguments have been heard and considered. 68 More broadly, oral
argument allows the public to see the Court as an impartial tribunal exploring
issues of national importance through a balanced adjudicative process. 69 Oral
argument shows the public that the Court practices Rule of Law valuesparticularly, transparency in decision making and equal consideration of the
arguments in a neutral forum. As such, there is an expectation that the Court
ought to reflect norms of equality, transparency, and fairness. To the extent
that it does not act fairly in regard to its own members, it is hard to expect
the public to believe that the Court will act fairly to external parties before
the Court.
The key takeaways from this literature are that conventional or in-person
oral argument plays an integral role in how U.S. Supreme Court Justices
make decisions and is central to the Court's legitimacy. Thus, any change in
the form and function of oral argument in response to the coronavirus
pandemic has broad institutional significance. The next Section describes the
switch to telephonic oral argument, the motivation for that choice of forum,
and the immediate consequences of that choice.
B.

THE ADOPTION OF TELEPHONIC ORAL ARGUMENT

On March 16, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court temporarily suspended oral
argument in response to the emerging coronavirus pandemic. 70 At the time
of this initial two-week suspension, fewer than 5,000 Americans had tested
positive for COVID-19 and fewer than 100 deaths in the United States had
been directly tied to the disease. 71 Two weeks later, as the number of reported
cases climbed to over 270,000, the Court postponed the hearings scheduled
for April as well. 72 By the end of April 2020, the number of confirmed
COVID-19 cases in the United States had surpassed one million, 73 the death
toll had risen to more than 58,000,74 and the majority of states were subject
67 Even compared to other courts, the Supreme Court lacks transparency in its decision-making
process. The Court's jurisdiction is largely discretionary and it usually chooses which cases it will hear
without explanation. The Justices are not governed by a published code of ethics, and issues such as
whether a Justice should recuse him or herself are made on an ad hoc basis. See Barry Sullivan, Law and
Discretion in Supreme Court Recusals: A Response to Professor Lubet, 47 VAL. U. L. REv. 907, 912,
914-16 (2013). For a rare glimpse of a behind-the-scenes account of Supreme Court decision making,
see, for example, BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT

(1979).
68 See Jacobi & Sag, supranote 46, at 1168; Sullivan & Canty, supra note 34, at 1011.
69 Jacobi & Sag, supra note 46, at 1168; Sullivan & Canty, supra note 34, at 1012.
70 Press Release 03-16-20, SUP. CT. U.S. (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_03-16-20.
71 Coronavirus Updates from March 16, 2020, CBS NEWS (Mar. 17, 2020,
2 2 7:39 AM),
0 0-03-16.
https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/coronavirus-updates-cases-fears-deaths-us-latest72 Press Release 04-03-20, U.S. SUP. CT. (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/

publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_04-03-20.
?3 As of April 30, 2020,
COVID-19 Cases, supra note
?4 Morgan Winsor & Ella
CDC Says, ABC NEWS (Apr.

the United States had 1,061,638 confirmed cases. Trends in Number of
21.
Torres, CoronavirusDeaths 'Likely to Continue to Rise'in Coming Weeks,
28, 2020, 9:23 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/coronavirus-updates-
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to "shelter-in-place" orders.7 5 It was clear by this time that life in the United
States would not be returning to normal anytime soon. 76 It was equally clear
that the important business of the Court could not be deferred indefinitely.7 7
Fading hopes of a speedy resumption of normal public activity and the need
to resolve at least some of the most salient cases before the November
election overcame the Court's reflexive institutional conservatism. On April
28, 2020, the Court announced that it would alter its normal process and hear
arguments remotely in thirteen cases (in ten arguments) with Justices and
counsel participating via telephone conference.'
The Supreme Court clearly needed to act to find an alternative forum for
hearing these important cases, but it had choice over how to do so. Its choice
in forum had significance beyond simply how it would hear the remaining
cases. The Court could have conducted oral argument over videoconference
and retained the traditional structure of a sixty-minute argument divided
equally between Petitioner and Respondent. Doing so would have permitted
the Justices to continue to speak on their own initiative, following a long
tradition of dynamic interaction between the Justices and the advocates: until
the change of forum, advocates appearing before the Court were subject to
interruption and interrogation by any of the Justices at almost any time. 79
At a point in time when schools, colleges, businesses, and a number of
other public institutions were transitioning en masse to videoconference
pandemic-world-listened/story?id=70378215 (reporting more than 58,000 deaths in the U.S. as of April

28, 2020).
?5 See Sarah Mervosh, Denise Lu & Vanessa Swales, See Which States and Cities Have Told Residents
to Stay atHome, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirusstay-at-home-order.html (showing thirty states under shelter-in-place orders by March 30, 2020).
76 Although the Court recognized the need to protect itself from the coronavirus in mid-March of
2020, the Court's first ruling in relation to the growing health emergency was premised on a seemingly
willful disregard of the severity and implications of the pandemic. In Republican National Committee v
DemocraticNationalCommittee, the Supreme Court granted a stay against a lower court order extending
the window for receipt of absentee ballots in the Wisconsin Spring election held on April 7, 2020.
Republican Nat'l Committee v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, et al., 589 U.S. _ (2020). The district court
had granted the injunction to safeguard the availability of absentee voting in Wisconsin's spring election
in view of the dramatically evolving COVID-19 pandemic. Id. And yet the conservative majority of the
Supreme Court saw the situation as not "substantially different" from "an ordinary election," id. at 3, a
suggestion that Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, characterized as mind-boggling. Id. at 4. There is at least
some evidence that Wisconsin's failure to postpone its spring election and the Court's stay order increased
the spread of the coronavirus in Wisconsin. Chad D. Cotti, Bryan Engelhardt, Joshua Foster, Erik Nesson
& Paul Niekamp, The Relationship Between In-Person Voting, Consolidated Polling Locations, and

Absentee Voting on COVID-19: Evidence from the Wisconsin Primary (May 11, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript), (available at https://ssm.com/abstract=3597233).
77 See, e.g., Editorial Bd., The Supreme Court on Hold, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2020, 5:26 PM)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-supreme-court-on-hold-11586121994 (arguing that "the Justices may
have to consider virtual oral arguments-or even delay their annual summer break.").
78 Press Release 04-30-20, U.S. SUP. CT. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
press/pressreleases/pr_04-30-20. Note that since some of the cases were consolidated, the Court sat for
ten arguments during May 2020.
79 CLERK OF THE CT., GUIDE FOR COUNSEL IN CASES TO BE ARGUED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. SUP. CT. 9 (2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/
Guide%20for%20Counsel%202019_rev10_3l19.pdf. Note that the Court introduced a new guideline for
the 2019 Term that advocates would generally be given two minutes ofuninterrupted time at the beginning
of their presentation. Early data suggested that the rule change had effects beyond the newly established
quiet zone. See Tonja Jacobi, Timothy Johnson, Eve Ringsmuth & Matthew Sag, Look Who's Talking
Less: Supreme CourtJustices, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/

outlook/2019/11/01/look-whos-talking-less-supreme-court-justices (suggesting that the two minute rule
changed not only how the first two minutes of oral argument were conducted, but impacted the entire
hour of oral argument). However, the two minute rule did not fundamentally change the overall character
of oral argument as an "exercise in structured disorder." See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 46, at 1167.
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platforms such as Zoom,80 it may seem strange that the Court opted to
conduct oral argument via telephone conference. One reason the Court
adopted the telephonic format is that the Court has, since the O.J. Simpson
trial, sought to avoid televised oral argument.8 1 For decades, the Justices have
opposed cameras and other electronic devices in their courtroom for fears
the media might misrepresent what the Court does and what the Justices
say.82 The result, in the Justices' estimation, would be that people exposed to
the media's misrepresentations would think poorly of the Court and,
consequently, its legitimacy-the ultimate source of its power-would
suffer. 3 For similar reasons, the Justices had also prohibited even live audio
streams of oral argument, only agreeing to release audio files at the end of
each week under the pressure of public demand. 84 However, because
members of the media could not be physically present at telephonic hearings,
the Court altered its rules and-for the first time ever-live streamed the
audio to media who could, in turn, stream it publicly.85
Thus, while the Court could have joined the rest of world on Zoom with
only minimal changes to the oral argument format, it opted instead for a far
more radical transformation of oral argument, albeit one effectuated with far
more prosaic technology. On Zoom, the Justices could have virtually raised
their hands when they wanted to respond to an advocate. In contrast, because
the telephone makes the visual cues that are essential to multi-person
dialogue impossible, the Court abandoned the freewheeling back-and-forth
80 Zoom peak daily meeting participants went from less than 10 million in December 2019 to more
than 200 million in March 2020 and more than 300 million in April 2020. See Mansoor Iqbal, Zoom
Revenue and Usage Statistics (2020), BUS. OF APPS (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.businessofapps.com/
data/zoom-statistics.
s' U.S. Supreme Court Appropriations, C-SPAN (Mar. 28, 1996), https://www.c-span.org/video/
?70835-I/us-supreme-court-appropriations (testimony before House Committee on Appropriations);
Richard Wolf, Cameras in the Supreme Court? Not Anytime Soon, USA TODAY (Mar. 7, 2019,4:52 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/03/07/justices-alito-kagan-say-video-cameras-have-

no-place-supreme-court/30861 87002.

82 For example, Justice Antonin Scalia articulated this concern in October 2006: "If I thought that
cameras in the Supreme Court would really educate the people, I would be all for it. But I think it would
miseducate and misinform. [. . .] Nobody's going to be watching that gavel-to-gavel except a few CSPAN junkies." Scalia: From "In Favor" to "Miseducat[ing] and Misinform[ing]", FIX CT. (Feb. 5,
2015), https://fixthecourt.com/2015/02/scalia-favor-miseducate-misinform. He adds, "[F]or every person
who watches us from gavel to gavel, there will be 10,000 who will watch a 15 or 30 second takeout on
the nightly news . . . . And I guarantee you that will not be characteristic of what we do." Sahil Kapur,

Scalia: Cameras in SCOTUS Would Lead to 'Miseducation',TALKING POINTS MEMO (Apr. 18, 2014,
11:52 AM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/scalia-cameras-in-supreme-court-miseduation.
Other current and former justices have made similar remarks. Justice David Souter's experience with
cameras in the New Hampshire Supreme Court led him to declare of the Supreme Court: "I think the case
[against cameras] is so strong .. . that I can tell you the day you see a camera come into our Courtroom,
it's going to roll over my dead body." On Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter Says, 'Over My DeadBody',
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/30/us/on-cameras-in-supreme-courtsouter-says-over-my-dead-body.html.
83 See Gibson et al., supra note 66, at 356.
* See Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, How SCOTUS Argument Transcripts and Recordings Became

Widely Available, SCOTUS OA (January 21, 2019), https://scotusoa.com/oyez-history (describing how
Chief Justice Rehnquist negotiated with the founder of Oyez.com over whether and how quickly to make
transcripts and recordings of arguments available to the public).
5 The Court's practice of providing written transcripts on the day of argument and delaying the
release of audio recordings violates the spirit, if not the letter, of various federal disability laws. See, e.g.,
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 5008 (requiring federal agencies to make their electronic and
information technology accessible to people with disabilities).
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of traditional oral argument for a series of sequential dialogues between
Justice and advocate. In the telephonic oral arguments, each advocate was
allowed to speak for two minutes uninterrupted, and then each Justice was
given the "opportunity to ask questions" in order of seniority.86 The Court's
press release did not explicitly say that the Justices would each be given an
87
equal opportunity for dialogue with counsel, but this was widely assumed.
As we explain in more detail in Part III, changing from an open
conversation to a hierarchical sequence of two-person dialogues had multiple
downstream effects on oral argument. 88 It made arguments longer, decreased
the frequency of interruption, and allowed the advocates to speak slower and
in longer sentences. 89 Subjectively, it made oral argument less dynamic and
less intellectually engaging. Ideas were not pursued to their logical
conclusion and topics were not fully explored, as Justices were limited in the
number of interactions they had with each advocate and were often cut off
from exploring follow-up inquiries. This loss of dynamism was not simply
an unfortunate loss of entertainment value: it reflected a significant
impairment in the ability of the Associate Justices to fully engage with the
advocates. 90
The flipside of that loss of influence by the Associate Justices points to
the second important implication of the decision to convert oral argument
into a hierarchical sequence of seriatim dialogues: it transformed the Chief
Justice from merely the "first among equals" to something akin to an
orchestra conductor or a tyrannical dinner party host. 91 Until recently, Chief
Justice Roberts would only occasionally intervene to dictate the tempo of
conversation or announce whose turn it was to speak. 92 Typically, he would
only do so when one Justice had interrupted another in a way that hijacked
the conversation. 93 However, telephonic argument necessitated someone to
announce when one dialogue ended and another began. Logically, that
someone was the Chief. The Chief Justice's central role in controlling who

86 Press Release 04-28-20, U.S. SUP. CT. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_04-28-20.
87

88

d

See infra Part IV.A.
89 Also, this would not have happened on Zoom: "Justice Breyer: Yeah, thank you. I'm sorry. The
telephone started to ring, and it cut me off the call. And I don't think it was a robo-call. (Laughter.)"
Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020)

(No. 19-177).
90 That any loss of dynamic interaction is of concern to both the Justices and the advocates is apparent
from the critical reaction to the introduction of the new two minute rule, discussed supranote 79. Justice
Elena Kagan said she's been "watching these people try to fill up two minutes of time without being
interrupted, and thinking, we should just do them a favor and interrupt them." C-SPAN, Justice Elena
Kagan on the Supreme Court and the Law (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.c-span.org/video/?466505Jordan S. Rubin & Kimberly Strawbridge
1/justice-elena-kagan-supreme-court-law&start=3130;
Robinson, Lawyers, Uninterrupted, Adjust to Supreme Court Ivo-Minute Rule, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 7,
2020) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/lawyers-uninterrupted-adjust-to-supreme-court-two
-minute-rule (reporting that the new rule was well-received by many advocates but relaying negative
quotes from "a dozen lawyers who've argued under the new rule so far this term.").
91 Timothy R. Johnson & Charles Gregory, The ChiefJustice and Oral Arguments, in THE CHIEF
JUSTICE: APPOINTMENT AND INFLUENCE 154 (Artemus Ward & David Danelski, eds., 2016) (discussing
the Chief Justice's status as first among equals especially during oral argument).
92
See Tonja Jacobi and Matthew Sag, Can Supreme Court Culture Change? (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with authors).
93 Id.
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spoke and for how long in the telephonic arguments gave him a new source
of power. As such, it is worth looking at how he used that power.
C.

THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE AT ORAL ARGUMENT

The Chief Justice of the United States has been referred to as holding
power "second only to the Presidency of the United States." 94 Chief Justices
begin the Court's agenda setting process,95 preside over oral argument,96
conference, 97 and assign opinions when they are in the
preside over
majority.98 However, despite the prestige associated with the position, the
power of the Chief is constrained in key ways. For one, there are few things
Chiefs can accomplish unilaterally. Indeed, important decisions such as
granting certiorari and setting precedent require a coalition of Justices. 99 For
another, there are many powers that other chief justices possess that the U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice does not have, such as choosing which justices
sit on a case.1 00
Prior to the recent telephonic hearings, Chief Justice Roberts had been
seen as relatively light-handed in his control of oral argument, especially
compared to his predecessor, Chief Justice William Rehnquist. 10' Early in
Chief Justice Roberts's tenure, one commentator noted, "The Rehnquist-toRoberts transition has altered the style of the Court. The atmosphere is more
relaxed and the chief justice is decidedly more laid back." 10 2 In fact, Chief
Justice Roberts has been criticized for not acting firmly enough in order to
rectify inequalities at oral argument, such as gender differences.1 03 More
generally, these insights suggest that how Chief Justice Roberts has carried
out the Court's oral argument procedures shapes the Justices' collective
94 115 Cong. Rec. 15,179 (daily ed. June 9, 1969) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
95 LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 90 (1998) (describing the norm that
the Chief Justice speaks first at conference); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 82

(1964) (describing the authority of the Chief Justice).
96 Johnson & Gregory, supra note 91, at 154.
97 Epstein & Knight, supra note 95, at 90; David M. O'Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in
American Politics 206 (2000) (describing conference procedures).
9 FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS III & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE
SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 7 (2000) (describing opinion writing procedure); Forrest
Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, A Conditional Model of Opinion Assignment on the Supreme Court, 57
POL. RSCH. Q. 551, 551 (2004) (describing the Chief Justice's opinion assignment authority).
* For an analysis of the power-spreading effect of these two rules, respectively, see Jeffrey R. Lax,

Certiorariand Compliance in the JudicialHierarchy: Discretion, Reputation, and the Rule of Four, 15

J. THEORETICAL POL. 61 (2003) (formally modeling the effect of the Rule of Four in granting certiorari
on the relative power of different justices on the Court); Tonja Jacobi, Competing Theories of Coalition
Formationand Case Outcome Determination, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 411 (2009) (formally modeling the
effects of different norms of coalition building on the relative power of different justices on the Court).
100 A power that the Australian Chief Justice possesses. See Jacobi, Robinson & Leslie, supra note
51 (comparing the powers of the Australian and U.S. Chief Justices).
101 See, for example, how Chief Justice Rehnquist reacted when he thought Justices Scalia and
Stevens were out of line in U.S. v R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291 (1992). Johnson & Gregory, supra note 91, at

167.
102 Michael McGough, Ardor in The Court; The Chief Justice Gets Rave Reviews For His Un-Stuffy
Approach. Will He Take the Next Step: Making the Court More Accessible?, PITr. POST-GAZETTE, Nov.
14, 2005, at B-7 (discussing Chief Justice Roberts's behavior at oral arguments).
103 Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 63, at 1485; Feldman & Gill, supra note 63; see also Timothy R.
Johnson & Ryan C. Black, The Roberts Court and Oral Arguments: A First Decade Retrospective, 54
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y. 137, 140 (2018).
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consideration of a given case: his forbearance has given all the Justices more
room to volley with their colleagues, push the attorneys, and, occasionally,
ignore them altogether. That changed with the telephonic sessions.
The formal role of the Chief Justice is quite limited during in-person oral
argument: his primary authority lies in determining how strictly to enforce
the typical thirty-minute time period allocated to each attorney. While he can
certainly try to quell an overbearing colleague during oral argument, if that
colleague is unwilling to yield the floor then the Chief has little recourse.
This stands in stark contrast to the role the Chief defined for himself in the
telephonic hearings. Specifically, in the telephonic era, the Chief speaks first
after the first two uninterrupted minutes; he then calls on each Associate
Justice in order of seniority.14 By providing each Justice a dedicated
opportunity to pose questions, the new arrangement clearly changed oral
argument; most obviously, Justice Thomas, who is well known for his sparse
participation in these proceedings,' 05 garnered attention after his repeated
engagement with attorneys during the new telephonic argument
procedures.'06
While the new procedure is superficially more equitable in terms of
speaking time, its implementation hinges on the Chief Justice in a way that
far exceeds traditional oral argument. By endowing the Chief with the
authority to determine when to end each Justice's turn and each attorney's
answers, the new telephonic oral argument procedure empowered the Chief
to shape the content and tenor of the Court's conversation about each case.
In other words, the discretion provided to the Chief Justice during telephonic
oral arguments allowed for the possibility that his decision to end a Justice's
turn would advantage some Justices and viewpoints over others. Such
actions would shape the alternatives and information the Court considered
as it moved into conference and opinion writing.
We posit that this version of telephonic oral argument gave the Chief
Justice new opportunities to behave strategically. Although there were
instances of a Justice voluntarily ending his or her turn during the telephonic
arguments,1 07 Chief Justice Roberts often interrupted the advocate or
8
Associate Justice who was speaking to transition to the next Justice.10
Research on interruptions during traditional oral arguments suggest that the
Chief Justice's use of this new authority was not likely to be evenhanded:

&

104 The change is intuitive, in some sense, because none of the participants (Justices or attorneys)
could see one another. Thus, the Court may have reasoned that someone had to call on the speakers to
avoid potential chaos and over talk-or so the Court thought. However, several circuits have used
telephonic argument or online video sessions with normal procedures, such as the Texas Supreme Court,
without having the chief judge call on others to speak. See Coyle, supranote 4.
1i See Timothy R. Johnson, Maron Sorenson, Maggie Cleary & Katie Szarkowicz, COVID-19 and
Supreme Court Oral Argument: The Curious Case of Justice Clarence Thomas, 21 J. APP. PRACTICE
PROCESS 113, 125 tbl. 3 (2021) (showing that Thomas has spoken very little during his career but spoke
in every case during the telephonic hearings).
106 Id.; see also Jess Bravin, Supreme Court's First Teleconferenced Argument Heard Live, Is
PracticallyGlitch-Free,WALL ST. J. (May 4,2020,3:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-supremecourt-hears-arguments-by-teleconference-amid-coronavirus-pandemic- 11588600318; Jeanine Santucci,
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas Asks Rare Questions DuringFirst Telephone Argument, USA
TODAY (May 4, 2020, 1:43 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/05/04/supremecourt-justice-clarence-thomas-asks-rare-questions-telephone/3078116001.

107 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Trump v. vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19635). Justice Clarence Thomas ended his questioning of Jay Sekulow with a simple, "Thank you."
101 See

infra Part III-D.
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Jacobi and Schweers found that interruptions between one Justice and
another during in-person arguments are gendered and shaped by ideology
and seniority during both the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts. 0 9 More
specifically, women are more likely to be cut off by men, Justices primarily
interrupt those ideological opposite themselves, and senior Justices more
often interrupt junior Justices. 0
Jacobi and Schweers's analysis indicates that Justice Sotomayor was the
most interrupted Justice-by both male advocates and male Justices."' In
the telephonic hearings, it was notable that Justice Sotomayor was repeatedly
interrupted by the Chief Justice. In those cases, he repeatedly stepped in to
interrupt a specific question and to put an involuntary end to her dialogue
with the advocate. For instance, in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, Justice
Sotomayor was initially interrupted by the advocate and then was cut off in
her second attempt to ask a question, this time by the Chief, and only two
words in:
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: One last question: Was the breadth of
these subpoenas litigated below?
DOUGLAS N. LETTER: Yes, Your Honor, those -JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The breadth?
DOUGLAS N. LETTER: -- those -- yes, Your Honor, those exact
claims were made and they are discussed in great detail by the Second
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit. So those were fully litigated below.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Breadth or -CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

Justice Kagan?"

2

The Chief also interrupted Justice Sotomayor later in the same
argument,"1 3 again in the same way in McGirt"4 and Chiafalo u
Washington," 5 and twice more in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and
PaulHome v. Pennsylvania."16 In Little Sisters, the Chief actually interrupted
Justice Sotomayor twice in regards to one line of inquiry." 7

10 Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 63, at 1451 (showing that gender, ideology, and seniority are all
statistically significant predictors of interruptions, although seniority is "substantially minuscule," in
contrast to ideology and gender).
I0 Id. at 1454- -55 (showing that there are statistically significant differences between interruptions
by gender, ideology, and seniority, as well as interaction effects between them).
i Id. at 1468, 1470, 1485 (calling on the Chief to "be more assertive in preventing an interruptereven an interrupting Justice- from continuing his question" or at least subsequently to "give the floor
back to the interruptee.").
12 Transcript of Oral Argument at 67-68, Trump v. Mazars U.S.A., LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020) (No.
19-715).
Id. at 88.
"31
4
" Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (No. 18-9526).
"5 Transcript of Oral Argument at 63, Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (No. 19-465).

16 Transcript of Oral Argument at 20 and 79, Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v.

Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) (No. 19-431).
7
"

Id. at 80.
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Combined, the extant literature-about traditional oral argument, the
Chief's role as first among equals on the Court, and the strategic maneuvers
available to him with the change to telephonic arguments-leads us to expect
that Chief Justice Roberts (and any other Chief) is more likely to cut short
the turn of ideologically distant colleagues, of women Justices, and of more
junior Justices. These examples suggest that is exactly what happened in the
telephonic cases.
But impressions can be misleading; confirmation bias may cause us to
notice Chief Justice Roberts interrupting Justice Sotomayor because we
know that female Justices and liberal Justices are interrupted more at oral
argument. Or it may be the case that Justice Sotomayor was
disproportionately interrupted in these cases, but no more so than she
generally is in the in-person cases. To truly explore the impact of the choice
of the telephonic forum as the Court's response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
we need to rigorously compare like with like.
To undertake that analysis, we could of course have just listened to the
ten telephonic oral arguments and recounted our impressions. But with such
politically salient cases being selected, the cases necessarily involve highly
polarized and emotional topics, 11 8 so we need an objective basis for
analyzing them. We next explain how an empirical approach allows us to do
so in a comprehensive analysis of not only the telephonic cases but also of
their direct comparators, the in-person cases of the current natural Court (i.e.,
the 2018 Term and 2019 Term in-person cases).

III.

NEW EMPIRICAL TOOLS

Determining how to rigorously compare the performance of the Justices
to one another in telephonic hearings and to themselves in the in-person cases
forced us to rethink the standard empirical tools used to measure activity at
Supreme Court oral argument. The empirical literature typically focuses on
what the Justices do at oral argument: most commonly, how many times they
speak (turns or speech episodes), how many words they say, their tendency
118 Many raised issues potentially directly affecting the upcoming presidential election. See, e.g.,
Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2026 (assessing limits on state investigations of the president and congressional
subpoenas of the president); Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2420 (2020) (assessing limits on state
criminal investigations of the president), Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2320 (addressing the constitutionality of
faithless electors), Colorado Dep't of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020) (same). In the more
general category of "hot button political issues," there were three religion cases: Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct.
at 2372 (addressing the permissibility of a conscience exemption from ACA's birth control requirement);

Trump v. Pennsylvania 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) (same); Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. MorrisseyBerru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020) (addressing whether federal courts should hear discrimination claims
by teachers at Catholic schools). There were three important commercial cases: Agency for International

Development v Alliance for Open Society International,Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2082, 2086 (2020) (assessing the

permissibility of funding requirements for HIV treatment); Barr v. American Assn of Political
Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2343 (2020) (analyzing debt collection practices); UnitedStates PTO

v. Booking.com B. V, 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2301 (2020) (examining the applicability of trademark protection

for URLs). Arguably this final commercial case was less salient and may have been a "practice round"
for the Court. As the first case, it demonstrated the struggles of Justices and advocates as Justice
Sotomayor and attorney Erika Ross struggled to get the microphones working at various points. The final
case, McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), was effectively a rehearing of an issue that the Court
ducked last Term, likely because it would have been decided four-to-four without Justice Kavanaugh yet
on the Court. With the outcome potentially affecting the land rights of a huge swath of Oklahoma, and
forcing the overruling of potentially thousands of convictions, the Court was understandably reluctant to
delay this case again.
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to interrupt and be interrupted, and the frequency of questions as opposed to
comments.' 9 This Justice-focused approach worked well in the free-flowing
context of in-person oral argument, but it could be quite misleading in
assessing the telephonic era in which each Justice is given a certain amount
of time to interact exclusively with each advocate. Consider, for example,
the question of interruptions. Several studies have examined Justice-toJustice interruptions at oral argument.12 0 However, in the telephonic cases,
speaking order was determined by seniority, and the transition from one
Justice's time to another's was signaled expressly by the Chief Justice. Given
this change in the rules, we did not expect to see-and indeed did not
observe-any instances of the Associate Justices interrupting each other in
the telephonic hearings.
The problem is not limited to interruptions. Normally, Supreme Court
oral arguments run on a strict schedule. Thus, any time used by one Justice
to make his or her point necessarily diminishes the time available for other
Justices to do likewise. In that context, gauging the intensity of a Justice's
participation by counting the number of words spoken makes sense.
However, in the telephonic hearings, the Justices' interactions with the
advocates are essentially quarantined from each other, and so the relevant
question is not how many words a Justice says, but how much time the
Justice is allowed for that interaction. Indeed, simply looking at standard
measures of the Justices' participation may render misleading results in the
telephonic oral arguments.
The argument in Trump v. Mazars is illustrative.' 2 ' The case addressed
the legality of Congressional subpoenas to third parties regarding President
Trump's financial activities prior to the presidency. For obvious reasons, this
was one of the most politically salient cases of the 2019 Term. 2 2 As such,
the relative opportunity for participation of the liberal and conservative
Justices is highly pertinent. In that case, Justice Ginsburg's first speech
episode was 159 words in length-more than double the average speech
episode of a Justice in the telephonic cases.1 2 3 Thus, it might seem on the
standard measures that Justice Ginsburg was given a greater chance to be
heard in this important and likely highly ideologically divided case. But the
Chief Justice interrupted the advocate's answer to Justice Ginsburg midsentence to invite Justice Thomas to speak, and the Chief did not allow
Justice Ginsburg another speech episode with that advocate.1 24 In contrast,
the Chief allowed Justice Alito two speech episodes with the first advocate
19 See, e.g., Jacobi & Sag, supra note 46, at 1203-09 (analyzing sixty-five years of oral argument
using these measures).
120 Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 63. But cf Black, Johnson & Owens, supranote 16 at 83, 92-93
(showing, empirically, how the curved shape of the bench significantly decreased the number of
interruptions from the bench); Black, Johnson & Wedeking, supra note 39, ch. 2 (demonstrating the
factors that lead Justices to interrupt one another during oral arguments).

121 Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2019.

122 For instance, SCOTUSBlog listed the case as one of the eleven "major cases" of the Term. Term
Snapshot, October2019 Term, SCOTUSBLOG (on file with the author).
123 See infra Table 1.

124 Subsequently, each Justice was permitted another chance to speak in the argument, but this was
also not distributed fairly. See infra note 157.
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in Mazars, which were 40 and 56 words, respectively. Looking simply at
word count, one would conclude that Justice Alito had only 60% of the
speaking opportunity than did Justice Ginsburg in this part of the hearing.
However, the advocate was permitted 197 and 141 words, respectively, to
address Justice Alito's issues of interest but only 174 words to respond to
Justice Ginsburg. As such, Justice Alito was effectively given 30% more
opportunity for dialogue with the advocate than Justice Ginsburg was
granted.
Given the serial dialogue format of telephonic oral argument, we believe
the best way to measure each Justices' share of the oral arguments is to focus
on their opportunityfor dialogue with an advocate, rather than simply the
number of words a Justice said, or the number of seconds they took to say
them. Relative opportunity for participation is important because, to the
extent these opportunities are unequal, the representation of ideas and
arguments before the Court was also unequal. In contrast, how a Justice
chooses to divide their allotted time between speaking and listening says
relatively little about the equality of the presentation of ideas during the
argument. For instance, if one Justice asks three quick questions and gets
three quick answers from an advocate, and another Justice makes one long
speech and gets one short answer from an advocate, how do we compare
these two interactions? It is possible that both interactions may take the same
amount of time, in which case the Justice making the long speech will
measure as more active, having had more words and a longer duration in
their individual activity levels. But, arguably, that interaction is not as
substantive as the Justice who speaks fewer words but who has multiple
interactions with the advocate.
25
Consider two different approaches in June Medical Services v. Russo.1
Justice Sotomayor asked a long question, thereby using many words, when
she asked about hospital admitting privileges for doctors. However, she
obtained a relatively short response from counsel:
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That -- that's a great example, because
he's the doctor who does only medical abortions, not surgical. He
hadn't done a surgical procedure for over 12 years. And your state's
own expert testified that it was not likely that he was going to get
privileges anywhere because he only did medical procedures, never
saw a patient. In virtually all of the hospitals, if not all of them, even
if there wasn't -- like in Tulane, even if there wasn't a minimum
number of patients that had to be admitted before you got privileges,
you had to see a certain number of patients in the hospital per year to
maintain your privileges. And he couldn't meet that requirement. So
you talk about him applying to only one hospital in a situation where
it was guaranteed that he couldn't meet the requirements of any
hospital.

125 Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, June Med. Servs. L. L. C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020)
(No. 18-1323).
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My understanding of hospital practice today is you got to stay alive
only if somebody sees patients -MS. MURRILL: If -JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- because if they don't see patients,
they're of no value to the hospital. If the patients aren't admitted and
there's no circumstance in which this doctor is going to admit a patient
because he does no surgical procedures -MS. MURRILL: Justice Sotomayor, I think the record shows that the
-- that they can get privileges, they did get privileges, and there's
nothing in the bylaws that prohibits them from being .. .126
In contrast, Justice Alito explored the issue of standing in the same case
using a series of short questions that elicited more information:
JUSTICE ALITO: Would you agree with the general proposition that
a party should not be able to sue ostensibly to protect the rights of
other people, if there is a real conflict of interest between the party
who is suing and those whose rights the party claims to be attempting
to defend?
MS. RIKELMAN: No, Your Honor, not if that party is directly
regulated by the law in question. And, in fact, this Court has allowed
third-party standing in cases where the state argued that the third
parties were protected by the law and in a sense protected from the
plaintiffs.
JUSTICE ALITO: Really? That's amazing. You think that if the
plaintiff actually has interests that are directly contrary to those of the
-- those individuals on whose behalf the plaintiff is claiming to sue,
nevertheless that plaintiff can have standing?
MS. RIKELMAN: If the plaintiff is directly regulated by the law. This
Court has allowed an attorney to bring third-party claims against a
statute that capped attorneys' fees in favor of clients.
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, that's amazing. Let's -- I mean -- I -- I -suppose -- I know you think that the admitting privileges requirement
serves no safety purpose, but suppose that the regulation that was
being challenged was one that a lot of people might think really did
serve a safety purpose ... .12
No doubt, the Justices used their time differently because they were
trying to make different points, in service of different objectives. The point
126 Id. at 51-52.
127 Id. at 6-8.
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is that it is not possible to meaningfully compare these two types of
interactions by counting the words of the Justices alone. In contrast, taking
account of the opportunity for dialogue with the advocate afforded to each
Justice allows us to assess whether and to what extent the Justices were
treated equally.
Operationalizing this concept of opportunity for dialogue in the
telephonic cases was relatively simple since, with minor exceptions, the
transcripts in those cases proceed through a sequence of Justice-advocate
pairs, punctuated by the Chief Justice's "traffic management."1 2 8 However,
to make valid comparisons between the in-person and telephonic hearings
required sorting the more chaotic in-person hearings into Justice-advocate
pairs. To address this, we coded oral argument transcripts using a precise
definition of an "interchange" between a Justice-advocate pair. 29 By
"interchange," we mean all of the time taken or words spoken between a
specific Justice and a specific advocate, by either of them, until a new
Justice-advocate interchange begins. Consider the hypothetical sequence:' 30
Justice
Advocate
Justice
Advocate
Justice
Advocate
Justice
Advocate

1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1

Here, the first four speech episodes would constitute a single J1-A 1
interchange, interrupted by a J 2-A, interchange, followed by a second J1-A1
interchange. 31 In contrast, when we refer to the "dialogue" between a
Justice-advocate pair, we mean the sum total (per case) of all of the
interchanges between that particular Justice-advocate pair.
Analyzing Justice-advocate pairs in this way allows us to examine the
amount of time each pair interacts and the substantive aspects of these
interactions. This is an exacting way to measure participation and permits us
to accurately examine one of the most interesting features of these
interactions: how they end.1 32 In traditional in-person arguments, it is not
unusual for an advocate to finish their answer to a question from one Justice
128 For an explanation and discussion of this concept of traffic management, see infra text
accompanying note 167.
129 There are minor differences between some of the data presented in this Article and estimates by
Leah Litman. Leah Litman, Muted Justice (May 19, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract= 3605444). Litman relied on human judgment to determine the beginning and
end of what we would call a Justice-advocate interchange in the telephonic era. Our more formal
definition leads to results that diverge slightly from Litman's. There are tradeoffs to each approach, but
making valid comparisons between the telephonic and in-person oral arguments demands a clear formal
definition of what constitutes interchange.
130 For clarity, we have underlined the speech episodes that begin a new interchange.
131 Note that we treat a sequence such as JI, A 1, JI, AI, JI, J2, JI, AI, as a single interchange between
JI and AI because the advocate did not respond to J2. Note also that an advocate's interruption of a Justice
is simply part of the interchange.
132 See infra Part IV.D.
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only to find another Justice seamlessly presenting another question. 3
However, it is also quite common during in-person arguments for a Justice
to simply interrupt the advocate's answer to someone else's question or for
the Justices to interrupt or talk over each other in their rush to ask the next
question. By breaking down the arguments into a sequence of Justiceadvocate interchanges, we are able to systematically investigate how the
individual interactions between Justices and advocates are terminated and
how those interactions compare across telephonic and in-person arguments.
With these tools in hand, we now turn to our empirical exploration of the
telephonic cases.' 3 4
IV.

EMPIRICALLY EXPLORING CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS'S USE
OF HIS NEW AUTHORITY

In this Part, we present our empirical analysis of the 2019 telephonic
cases and compare them to both the 2019 cases heard in-person, as well the
2018 cases heard since Justice Kavanaugh joined the Court. We begin with
descriptive statistics concentrating on the structural differences between
telephonic and in-person oral argument.
A.

STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TELEPHONIC AND IN-PERSON
ORAL ARGUMENT

To explore the significance of the Supreme Court's new format for
remote oral argument, we constructed a dataset derived from the transcripts
of Supreme Court oral arguments in the 2018 and 2019 Terms. Our data
comprises 123 cases in total: 65 from 2018, 48 from in-person oral argument
in 2019 and 10 from the telephonic oral arguments. 135 In these 123 cases,
there were almost 30,000 speech episodes and more than 1.3 million words
spoken by the Justices and advocates. Table 1 provides the descriptive data
at the highest level of aggregation.

13 Experienced advocates know not to pause at the end of a sentence if they have something else
they want to say.
134 For each of the analyses below, we replicate the analysis looking only at the behavior of the
Justice, rather than the interaction between the Justice and the advocate. For instance, instead of
examining interchanges, we examine the number of turns of each Justice not including the time in which
the advocate responds to each Justice. The results (available from the authors) are the same. We only
present the results of the pair analysis because we believe this is a better way of analyzing oral argument
in general and particularly in the artificial structure of the telephonic arguments.
135 We include only cases from the fourth natural Roberts Court-i.e., only those cases heard after
Justice Kavanaugh joined the Court in October 2018. This excludes the first six of the seventy-one cases
argued in the 2018 Term.
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Table 1: Aggregate descriptive data
Words

Minutes

Minutes

Words

Era

Cases

Turns

(total)

(total)

(mean)

(mean)

Telephonic

10

2,170

134,885

851

85

13,489

2019 Inperson

48

11,523

520,994

2,937

61

10,854

2018 In-

65

15,436

691,137

3,911

60

10,633

123

29,129

1,347,016

7,700

63

10,951

person

All cases

Despite Chief Justice Roberts's considerable efforts to move them along,
the telephonic hearings were on average 40% longer than the in-person
hearings from 2018 and 2019 (differences are highly statistically significant,
p<0.01).136 The telephonic arguments were also slower than the in-person
cases. In the telephonic cases, the Justices spoke at only 84% of the pace of
the 2019 in-person cases and 83% of the pace of the 2018 cases.137 Likewise,
the advocates spoke 7% slower in the telephonic cases than in the 2019 inperson cases and 6% slower than in the 2018 cases. 138
This reduction in pace is also reflected in the fewer number of speaking
turns per hearing in the telephonic cases (217 compared to 240 and 237 turns,
on average, in the 2019 and 2018 in-person cases, respectively), despite the
fact that the telephonic hearings lasted longer. 139 On average, there were 2.57
turns per minute in the telephonic forum, compared to 3.91 and 3.93 turns in
the 2019 and 2018 in-person arguments (differences are highly statistically
significant, p<O.Ol)-that is, there were only 64% the number of turns taken
in the telephonic cases. Another way of seeing that individual speaking turns
lasted longer in the telephonic hearings is to examine the number of words
per turn. Compared to the 2019 in-person oral arguments, advocates spoke
more than 55% additional words per turn in the telephonic cases; whereas in

136 Highly statistically significant means the p-value is less than 0.01; that is, we can be confident
that the chance of this relationship showing as a result of random error is less than 1%. The standard
benchmark for statistical significance is a p-value of less than 0.05; that is, there is less than a 5% chance
of random error creating the result. We use these two terms throughout the analysis.
137 The Justices spoke at 2.30 words per second in the telephonic hearings; in contrast, they spoke at
2.71 and 2.73 words per second, respectively, in the 2019 and 2018 in-person cases (differences are highly

statistically significant, p<0.01).
138 The advocates spoke at 2.88 words per second in the telephonic cases; in contrast, they spoke at
3.11 and 3.08 words per second, respectively, in the 2019 and 2018 in-person cases (differences are
statistically significant, p<0.05).
139 P-values are not informative to assess the statistical significance of this difference due to the
multiple ways in which the groups have to be split in order to run this test. Whereas ordinarily we are
comparing Justice behavior among different groups, e.g. mean duration of liberal Justices versus
conservative Justices, and have a large number of observations, when we are comparing the difference in
duration for each Justice between two eras, then our observations are only equal to half of the number of
Justices. As such, it is appropriate for the reader to assess whether the difference is substantially
significant or not, a question of judgment rather than statistics.
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the same comparison, the Justices spoke 23% more words per turn .140 The
increase in the number of words per turn does not mean that the participants
spoke more quickly; rather, it means they spoke longer before either
finishing their point or before being interrupted.
Each of the measures discussed above is consistent with the general
observation that, on average, the telephonic oral arguments lacked the
dynamism of traditional in-person oral argument. However, it is important to
look beyond averages and explore variation before taking these conclusions
to the bank-one can still drown in a river that is, on average, only three feet
deep.' 4' Figure 1 illustrates the total duration of each argument in the 2019
Term, as well as how that time was divided between the Justices and the
advocates. It is apparent at a glance that although there is variation within
the telephonic cases, those cases as a group are different from the in-person
oral arguments. 142

140 Advocates spoke an average of 97 words per turn in the telephonic hearings and only 66 and 64
in the 2019 and 2018 in-person oral arguments, respectively (differences are highly statistically
significant, p<0.01). The Justices spoke an average of 37 words per turn in the telephonic hearings, 30 in
the rest of the 2019 Term and 31 in the 2018 Term (differences are highly statistically significant, p<0.01).
141 Nate Silver, The Signal and The Noise 179 (2012).
142 Interestingly, there was no statistically significant difference between the telephonic and in-person
hearings in terms of the ratio of advocates speaking to Justices speaking. In words, the advocates spoke
between 64% and 66% of the total in each era; in terms of the duration, the advocates accounted for
between 61% and 62% of the total in each era.
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Figure 1: Duration of oral argument 2019 Term by case
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The x-axis presents the 2019 Term cases in the order they were argued

and divides each case between advocates' speaking time (below in lighter
gray) and Justices' speaking time (above in darker gray). On the right are the
final ten telephonic cases with slightly more divergent shading. 14
Note, first, that the increase in the length of the oral argument during the
telephonic cases is consistent and significant. This highlights the effect of
different institutional structures: the shortest oral argument in the telephonic
era was longer than the average case in the in-person era. Ordinarily, oral
argument is set for an hour except where the Court provides for extra timetypically in cases with multiple advocates or when a case is particularly
important to the public. In the 2019 term in-person cases, there were three
outliers, which ranged from 20% to 38% over the normal length.' 44 But there
are two important points to note about these outliers: First, two of these cases
had four advocates and one had three advocates.1 45 Second, all three of these
cases had prespecified time extensions due to their complexity and the
I" Since the 2018 and 2019 in-person cases are quite similar, we ordinarily only graph the 2019
cases, here and elsewhere, except where there is meaningful difference between the 2019 and the 2018
Terms.
144 Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC, 140 S.
Ct. 1649 (2020) the seventh case heard, lasted 82 minutes; Department of Homeland Security v. Regents
of the University of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) the eighteenth case heard, lasted 83 minutes; and
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) the forty-seventh case
heard, lasted 75 minutes.
'" Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico had four advocates appearing;
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California had three advocates
appearing; and Scila Law LLC had four advocates appearing.
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appearance of additional parties.1 46 All other in-person cases were heard in
fewer than 63 minutes, even though thirty-two of the forty-eight in-person
cases had more than two advocates appearing.
In contrast, during the telephonic era, only one of the ten cases lasted
fewer than 63 minutes-ColoradoDepartment of State v. Baca,14' the final
case of the Term, which lasted 61 minutes. All other cases lasted between 69
and 109 minutes, with an average of 85 minutes. These extraordinarily long
arguments were not, on the whole, driven by the appearance of additional
advocates-in half of those cases only the standard two advocates
appeared.1 48 In fact, in both the 2018 and 2019 in-person cases, more
advocates appeared, on average, than in the telephonic cases. 14 9 If we
compare only arguments with two advocates appearing, the average lengths
are 70.57 minutes in the telephonic cases and 59.30 minutes in the in-person
cases. Thus, the additional length of the telephonic cases does not appear to
be primarily a product of additional advocates; rather, the extra length stems
from the different institutional structure of the arguments. Institutional rules
clearly matter.
The telephonic oral arguments had, in essence, a very different feel from
the in-person cases: they lacked the back-and-forth dynamism of the freeflowing arguments in which Justices jump in at any time. Instead, the
telephonic cases featured more plodding questioning where the Justices'
chance to interact as the argument progressed was limited. We and others
think that telephonic cases were far less interesting for spectators due to this
lack of dynamism. 50 But the problem with lack of dynamism is not simply
a lack of entertainment. The telephonic format dramatically reduced the
ability of the Justices to pose questions directly in response to what the
advocate was saying. A Justice who has already spoken or whose time is at
an end has no chance to respond to a contentious point, and a Justice who is
waiting must continue to wait. This loss of dynamic interaction directly
undermines the information-seeking function of oral argument."'5 This is a
significant loss. We imagine, for example, that Justice Ginsburg would have
liked to have heard the end of the answer to her question in Trump v. Mazars
and may well have seen fit to follow up on the advocate's response. 52 In the
in-person hearings she would have had at least some chance of doing just
14

See, e.g., Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 33 (2019)

(extending time of oral argument to 80 minutes).

17 Transcript of Oral Argument, Colo. Dep't of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (No. 19-518).
148 In four cases, three advocates appeared, and in one case, four advocates appeared.

149 In the telephonic cases, there were on average 2.60 advocates appearing; in the in-person cases,
there were 2.71 advocates appearing on average in 2019, and 2.63 advocates appearing on average in

2018.

.

150 See, e.g., Jesse Wegman, Live From D.C., It's the Supreme Court!, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2020),
(describing
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/04/opinion/supreme-court-coronavirus-telephone.html
the first telephonic argument as "a spectacle made for the radio age" and "largely forgettable."). More
harsh in its assessment was Lyle Denniston's caustic tweet. Lyle Denniston, @lylden, TWITTER (May 6,
2020), https://twitter.com/lylden/status/1 257796446444756996?s=20 ("This harms equal status of each
Justice, gives the CJ arbitrary power, diminishes cross-bench exchanges, promotes wool-gathering by
lawyers, prizes order over depth, lets technology triumph, looks amateurish.").
"' See supra Part I.A.I
52 See discussion supra note 124.

2021 ]

Oral Argument in the Time of Covid

427

that, although she would have been competing with the other Justices for
airtime. Presumably, that potential opportunity is preferable to none.
The rules and format of the telephonic oral argument also seem to
undermine the "pre-conference" function of oral argument discussed in Part
I.153 The highly structured nature of the telephonic hearings made it much
more difficult for the Justices to talk to each other by posing questions to the
advocates. The Justices were unable to jump in with questions at moments
where advocates made proposals that were open to critique or to indicate to
their colleagues their concerns about weaknesses in a given side of the
argument. Instead, they had to wait until their designated opportunity to
speak, when often the point was no longer live. 1 4
The lack of dynamism and the loss of interaction of the telephonic cases
might be a cost worth bearing if the different institutional design brought
other benefits, such as greater speaking equality between the Justices. The
next two Sections show that although the telephonic forum was more equal
on some measures, it essentially substituted one kind of inequality for
another. The lack of dynamism in the telephonic arguments goes hand-inhand with the Chief's ability to control the flow of oral argument and to
determine whose voices are heard. Accordingly, whereas the inequalities of
in-person oral argument result from spontaneous interactions between the
Justices, the inequalities of the telephonic hearings primarily reflected the
decisions of the Chief Justice.
B.

THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE AMONG THE JUSTICES IN TELEPHONIC
AND IN-PERSON ORAL ARGUMENTS

1. The Discretion of the Chief Justice
Ordinarily, the role of the Chief Justice at oral argument is to start and
stop the argument, call upon the advocates, and occasionally partake in some
gatekeeping when it is unclear who should have the floor.1 S As discussed,
Chief Justice Roberts has been seen as presiding with a light touch in this
role t5 6-until the May 2020 argument sessions. The Chief Justice played a
much more central role in the telephonic oral arguments; although the order
of participation was pre-determined, he controlled when each Justice's time
to engage with the advocate would start and when it would stop, unless a
Justice voluntarily ended his or her questioning or passed. In the remainder
of this Part, we examine in various ways how the Chief Justice used this new
authority, whether he used it productively (in ways that furthered the
assumed goals of oral argument), and whether he used it evenhandedly.
153 See supra Part I.A.2.
154 And, consistent with this point, at least one commentator anticipated that the expected "disjointed"
nature of telephonic arguments would also disadvantage advocates, as they "may also lose the ability to
respond to a hostile question by pivoting to a different point in the hope of engaging a more friendly
justice." Adam Liptak, Virus Pushes a Staid Supreme Court Into Revolutionary Changes, N.Y. TIMES
(May 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/03/us/politics/supreme-court-coronavirus.html.
55 Scholars have called on the Chief to be more active, for instance, in response to evidence that
female Justices are interrupted more than male Justices and male Justices are less likely to recognize an
interruption of a female Justice than that of a male Justice. Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 63, at 1484-

85.
156 See supra text accompanying note

101.
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The case of Trump v. Mazars 57 illustrates vividly that the Chief was not
always even handed. During the oral argument in Trump v. Mazars, as
discussed, 158 Chief Justice Roberts cut off Justice Ginsburg before she had a
chance to ask a second question, or even to have her first question fully
answered. Despite having so abruptly cut off Justice Ginsburg, after each
Justice had spoken in order of seniority, Chief Justice Roberts announced
that there was time left over for additional questioning and declared, "[S]o I
think I'll begin with myself, and then we'll go through in order and just see
how far we get." 159 During the additional rounds of questioning in Mazars,
the Chief permitted himself four more substantive speech episodes (i.e., not
counting traffic management), in which he addressed four different
substantive issues: the potential for presidential harassment from multiple
committees;' 60 the complication of district attorneys and Congress both
subpoenaing the president;' 6 ' the possibility of the Senate also issuing
subpoenas; 2 and how to measure harassment.1 63 He permitted himself 245
words to pursue multiple additional comments and questions on each topic
and permitted the advocate, Douglas N. Letter, 597 to respond to his
inquiries. Subsequently, Justice Sotomayor was given a chance to speak. She
had one speech episode that was 64 words in length; Letter's response was
66 words in length, which consisted entirely of the advocate correcting a
factual assumption in her question. When Justice Sotomayor went to ask a
follow-up, she was only permitted 5 words, "[s]o how do we get --", before
being interrupted by the Chief.1 64 This contrast was striking, but it is only
one anecdote-we can use the power of systematic empirical analysis to
assess whether this was an isolated incident or represents a broader trend.
Telephonic Oral Argument Changed the Balance of Participation
Between the Justices
On a superficial appraisal, the telephonic forum actually appeared to
promote equality among the Justices, as shown in Figure 2. It displays the
average number of interchanges per hearing for each Justice in three different
groups of cases. Specifically, the left-hand portion of the figure shows the
average number of interchanges for each Justice in the telephonic cases; the
2019 and 2018 in-person cases appear, respectively, in the center and right
panels.1 65 To highlight the ideological consequences of the shift to telephonic
2.

'

Trump v. Mazars U.S.A., LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2019 (2020).

15 See supra text accompanying note 121.

159 Transcript of Oral Argument at 79, Trump v. Mazars U.S.A., LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020) (No.
19-715).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 80.
162 Id.
163Id at80-81.
16 Id. at 88.

165 The averages reported in Figure 2 are conditional upon a Justice speaking in a case. Accordingly,
Justice Thomas's bar is empty in the in-person 2019 cases in which he did not speak, and depicts an
average of one interchange in the 2018 cases even though he only had one interchange with an advocate
during the entire Term.
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hearings, all of the figures in this Section represent the conservative Justices
in dark gray and the liberal Justices in light gray.
We are particularly interested in the extent to which Chief Justice
Roberts used his new discretionary power to preference one speaker over
another. But if we were to simply count Roberts's turns, words, and duration,
we would risk over-counting his contribution due to what we call his "traffic
management role" (introducing the case, calling on the advocates or the
Justices to commence their speaking slot, etc.). It is important not to
disregard these elements, as they are a large part of how the Chief was able
to tilt the playing field in a given direction, but it is also important to not
count traffic management as part of his substantive participation as a
decision-maker. Accordingly, we show both Roberts's substantive
contribution and his traffic management, the latter indicated in pale gray.' 66
6
Figure 2: Average number of interchanges in oral argument 1
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At first blush, the average number of interchanges in the telephonic cases
appear far more equal than those in the in-person cases. In the telephonic
cases, everyone except Chief Justice Roberts looks almost identical in the
average number of interchanges, with the average ranging between 2.60
(Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Gorsuch) and 2.89 per case (Justices Kagan
and Sotomayor). In contrast, in the in-person cases, there is much more
variation, even putting aside Justice Thomas as an outlier, since he rarely
speaks in the in-person cases,' 68 but took his turn in every case in the

"' Although we initially used as an algorithm to make this distinction, we also manually reviewed
all of the Chief Justice's speech episodes in the 2018 and 2019 terms to confirm and refine the results of
the algorithm.
167 This figure illustrates the average number of interchanges per argument for each Justice,
conditional upon that Justice having spoken. This may overstate Justice Thomas' contributions to the

2018 oral arguments.
"6N Jacobi & Sag showed that between his entry to the Court in 1991, and 2015 (the end of their period
of study), Justice Thomas spoke on average only three words per case. Jacobi & Sag, supra note 46, at

1213.
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telephonic cases.1 69 Indeed, in 2019, the average number of interchanges
(setting aside Justice Thomas) varies from a low of 3.18 for Justice Gorsuch,
to a high of 5.04 for Justice Kagan and, in 2018, the range varies from 3.49
for Justice Gorsuch, to 5.28 for Justice Sotomayor. If instead of analyzing
interchanges between pairs, we examine individual Justice's turns (i.e.,
excluding the time of the advocate in responding to the Justice), the results
are substantively identical.1 0
Another element that gives a false impression of equality is that the
Chief's substantive interchanges during the telephonic cases mirror those of
the other Justices, at 2.80 interchanges, and it is only his traffic interchanges
that put him far ahead of the other members of the Court, at 8.00
interchanges. But, it is important to note the extent of this activity by the
Chief; he is almost three times as active as the other Justices due to his traffic
management role. In contrast, in the in-person cases, his traffic activity
constitutes fewer interchanges than the least active Justice who consistently
speaks-Justice Gorsuch. While we do not count the traffic management
interchanges as substantive, they should not be ignored. As such, Figure 2
makes clear just how dominant was the Chief's presence at the telephonic
oral arguments.
Otherwise, in terms of interchanges, the telephonic arguments were more
equal. But the simple number of blocs of time that each Justice speaks is a
very limited, formalistic measure of equality-it cannot capture how much
the Justices each get to say, how much they get to probe the advocates, and
how much influence they have on the direction of the argument. The
remainder of this Section shows that, on other measures that substantially
address those inquiries, the telephonic cases were highly unequal.
We begin this examination in Figure 3, which shows how the telephonic
cases compared to in-person arguments in terms of the mean duration of
Justice-advocate dialogues for each Justice in each case.' 1 The Justices are
ordered from longest to shortest duration. As before, the conservative
Justices appear in dark gray, the liberal Justices in light gray, and the time
the Chief devotes to traffic management is indicated in the lightest gray.1 2
169 The significant divergence of Justice Thomas from the other justices in the in-person cases in both
2018 and 2019 (and more generally), as well as how this changed in the telephonic cases, is discussed in
detail, infra text accompanying note 105.
170 As is true for all of the results that follow. Results available from the authors.
171 There are different ways to present these data. In this figure we have simply averaged the total
duration of each Justice's dialogues in any given case. We could present the average per unique dialogue
instead and this would lead to slightly different results where at least one side ofthe case was represented
by more than one advocate. See, e.g., Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: Results From the Court's
Experiment With a New Oral Argument Format, SCOTUSBLOG (May 22, 2020, 4:51 PM),
www.scotusblog.com/2020/05/empirical-scotus-results-from-the-courts-experiment-with-a-new-oralargument-format. Feldman's results are in line with ours, but he sets aside the Chief Justice's traffic
management ratherthan simply differentiating it from the Chief's substantive engagement.
1 2 Another way of measuring effectively the same thing is the number of words spoken-for all of
our analysis conducted in terms of duration, we conduct the same analysis in terms of number of words
spoken, and the results are consistently very similar. We present our results in the main text in terms of
duration rather than words because, while duration and number of words spoken are highly correlated,
time is the currency of oral argument. In contrast to the briefs, there is no mandated maximum word count
at oral argument; instead, there is a set time limit for each advocate and, ordinarily, for the overall
argument. See JOHNSON, supra note 33, Chapter 1 (on the history of oral argument).
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Figure 3: Justice share of oral argument duration, by pair interchanges
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The data presented in Figure 3 indicate that there was a significant shift
in the balance of influence between liberals and conservatives in the
telephonic hearings compared to the in-person cases in the Court. Jacobi and
Sag showed that the out-of-power ideological camp consistently speaks more
than the dominant group; for the last fifty years that has meant that the liberal
Justices speak more than the conservative Justices.1 4 The opposite took
place during the Warren years-when the liberals dominated the Court, the
conservatives dominated oral argument.1

75

This is the pattern we see in the

middle of Figure 3: in the 2019 in-person cases, there was an almost perfect
ideological split between the more active liberal Justices and the
comparatively inactive conservative Justices, only disordered by Justice
Ginsburg speaking slightly less than Justices Alito and Kavanaugh. The same
pattern emerges in the right side of Figure 2 (the 2018 cases); the only
difference is that Justice Ginsburg sits considerably lower down the
participation rankings, but during that Term she was being treated for, and
then recovering from, pancreatic cancer and a fall that broke her ribs.
The telephonic cases (the left side of Figure 3) are quite different. For
the first time in the then-current Court, a conservative Justice, Justice Alito,
was the most active Justice.1 76 Previously, Justice Alito had been fourth and

fifth in this share of argument, respectively, in 2019 and 2018. The benefit to
Justice Alito of having the Chief Justice, his close ideological ally,
controlling the sessions is apparent. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan continue
to have a greater-than-average role in oral argument in the telephonic cases,
but they have been eclipsed by Justice Alito, and to some extent by the Chief
Justice as well. On the other hand, Justice Breyer is pushed well down the
order of Justices in pair-duration, and Justice Ginsburg also moves down
173 The average durations reported in Figure 3 are conditional on speaking in a given case. As noted
previously, this may overstate Justice Thomas' contributions to the 2018 oral arguments.
14 Jacobi & Sag, supra note 46, at 122 1-23.
75
Id. at 1221-22.
176 Chief Justice Roberts comes in second, but this is partly due to his traffic management role in the
proceedings.
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compared to the 2019 in-person cases (remember that in 2018 she was
unusually quiet due to her illnesses). And of course, the most significant
change in relative contribution to oral argument was that of Justice Thomas.
Justice Thomas did not speak at all in the 2019 in-person oral arguments, and
he barely spoke in the 2018 Term. In contrast, in the telephonic cases, he
spoke an average of 2.14 minutes per case and his average dialogues with
the advocates totaled almost 8 minutes per case. In the telephonic cases,
Justice Thomas was no longer an extreme outlier,"'7 although his duration of
participation was still at the low end of the range. We address in detail below
whether the effect of the telephonic forum of promoting the participation of
Justice Thomas constitutes an equalizing force; for now, we simply note that
Justice Thomas is one of the conservative Justices whose participation
dramatically increased, while the liberal Justices' participation notably
decreased.
The data examined above indicate that the shift in format in the
telephonic hearings significantly changed the balance of participation
between the Justices, as compared to the in-person hearings of 2018 and
2019. In Figure 4, we provide additional evidence of this transformation by
considering different ways to measure participation. It shows the relative
change between the Justices in their turns, in the relative duration of those
turns, and in the difference in words spoken.

'n See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Clarence Thomas Breaks His Silence, ATLANTIC (Feb. 29, 2016),
("[N]ot since
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/clarence-thomas-supreme-court/471582
Clarence Darrow for the defense called prosecutor william Jennings Bryan himself to the stand has an
American courtroom been so startled" as when Justice Thomas spoke for the first time in a decade); see
also Johnson et al., supra note 105, at 142 (explaining how Justice Thomas significantly affected the
telephonic oral arguments).
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Figure 4: Differences in Justices' share of oral argument, winners and
losers, by pair interchanges
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Figure 4 displays the Justices' relative opportunities to participate at oral
argument in the telephonic cases compared to the in-person cases from the
2019 Term, measured in the number of speaking turns, duration in minutes,
and wordcount. The figure depicts who gained from the transition of
telephonic oral argument in terms of those opportunities-the "winners"and who had less such opportunity-the "losers." The calculation is simple:
for each Justice, we subtract their participation during 2019 in-person cases
from their telephonic participation (results using 2018 in-person cases are
substantially identical)."' As such, Justices whose bars appear to the right of
zero are beneficiaries in the telephonic cases while those whose bars lie to
the left of zero participated less in the telephonic cases.
Taking in the figure as a whole, the clear winner from the telephonic
cases is Justice Thomas. Of course, this stems from the fact that he did not
speak at all in 2019 (and barely spoke in 2018). Apart from Justice Thomas,
the only other Justice to consistently gain ground in every category is Chief
Justice Roberts. Even discounting his traffic management role, the Chief
granted himself more turns, as well as longer duration and more words, in
his interactions with the advocates.' 79
More important than any individual Justice's gain or loss of position is
the dramatic effect telephonic arguments had on the Court's two ideological
camps. In the most important category-duration-there is notable
ideological division between those who gained the most and those who lost
or gained less, with all conservative Justices considerably benefiting. With
much longer argument sessions, all of the Justices gained duration except for
Justice Breyer, who lost a very small amount of ground. But the gains for the
171 Once again, we are using the total number oftums, duration, and words from the relevant Justiceadvocate dialogues.
179 As we saw in Part IV.A, both advocates and Justices spoke in longer speaking turns in the
telephonic hearings, and thus the total number of turns was greatly reduced. In this context, it is
remarkable that the Chief gained ground even in that category. This is a certain sign he enjoyed being
more than "first among equals."
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other liberal Justices were extremely small, whereas the gains for all the
conservative Justices (other than Justice Kavanaugh), were substantial. On
average, each conservative Justice received 3.60 more minutes in their
interchanges with advocates, whereas the average liberal Justice was granted
a mere 0.61 minutes of additional time during the telephonic cases. The same
trend holds for words used, although Justices Kagan and Kavanaugh switch
places-Justice Kagan spoke faster than Justice Kavanaugh. On average,
each of the conservative Justices gained more than 454 words per argument
whereas the liberal Justices lost more than 26 words per oral argument. The
contrast in terms of the number of speaking turns was not perfectly sorted on
ideology, but in aggregate it was highly ideological: comparing the
telephonic hearings to the 2019 in-person oral arguments, conservative
Justices on average had 1.75 fewer turns, whereas liberal Justices had a
whopping 11.78 fewer turns.
The changes in the relative positions of the Justices illustrated in Figure
3 and the winners and losers comparison made in Figure 4 both demonstrate
the effect of the change in format from in-person to telephonic argument.
Since, most frequently, Justices did not voluntarily cede their time during
argument in the telephonic cases, the Chief Justice's decisions about how to
exercise his prerogative as master of ceremonies played a large role. In
contrast, the participation of each Justice in oral argument during in-person
hearings is determined by the Justice's own activism or reticence. In this new
paradigm of telephonic arguments, the conservative Justices were much
more involved. In other words, there is a clear and consistent ideological
impact emanating from the new format. Conservative Justices benefited from
this imposed structure and liberal Justices were disadvantaged.
One might be inclined to conclude that the telephonic cases were an
equalizing force, if only for incorporating Justice Thomas's participation.
However, there are two potential reasons why this characterization may not
be the best perspective: First, while many have surmised as to why Justice
Thomas remains silent,1 80 as well as to why he occasionally breaks his
silence,181 there is anecdotal evidence that he simply prefers to let others
speak and even to ask his questions for him.1 8 2 Second, Justice Thomas
180 Some have said Justice Thomas is simply not paying attention, essentially free riding on the efforts

of his colleagues. Jeffrey Toobin, Clarence Thomas s DisgracefulSilence, NEW YORKER (Feb. 21, 2014),
www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/clarence-thomass-disgraceful-silence ("These days, Thomas
only reclines; his leather chair is pitched so that he can stare at the ceiling, which he does at length. He
strokes his chin. His eyelids look heavy. Every schoolteacher knows this look. It's called 'not paying
attention."'). Jacobi & Sag, supra note 46, at 1214 (showing that "for most of the Court's modem history,
judicial silence was quite ordinary; what is unusual is not that Justice Thomas is silent, but that now he is
the only justice who is silent.").

"'See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Unexpected Importance of Clarence Thomas, POLITICO (Oct. 4,
2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/supreme-court-2016-clarence-thomas-legacy214319 ("Can it be a coincidence that Thomas made his voice heard immediately after Scalia's fell

silent?").
182 Others have noted Justice Thomas's tendency to whisper to Justice Breyer at oral argument. See,
e.g., Melissa Quinn, Telephone Arguments Spotlight Usually Silent Clarence Thomas, CBS NEWS (May
7, 2020, 10:21 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/clarence-thomas-supreme-court-questionstelephone-arguments ("While Thomas often does not address the lawyers who appear before the Supreme
Court, he is active when the justices hear cases in-person, whispering to Justice Stephen Breyer, who he
sits beside, and quietly soliciting records from court staff.").
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83
and
himself says that he does not like speaking in public generally,'
particularly does not see the point of Justices talking much at oral
argument. 4 He describes his colleagues as "talk[ing] too much," mostly out
of habit, and the advocates as not needing his contribution or that of the other
Justices. 185 As such, it is not clear that Justice Thomas himself necessarily
values an explicit expectation that he contribute at oral argument.
Another factor is that while the telephonic forum may have promoted
Justice Thomas's participation, it also had other unequalizing effects, as our
analysis showed. We believe that Justice Thomas being encouraged to
participate is a positive development-even if contrary to his inclinationas it leads to a better representation of diverse voices, and that is particularly
important as he is the only African American Justice on the Court. But how
do we weigh this gain against the loss of opportunity to participate of the
four liberal Justices? It is possible to say that the telephonic structure overall
had an equalizing effects if we adopted a Rawlsian "maximin" approach to
judicial participation at oral argument, whereby moral good is deemed to be
achieved when maximizing the opportunity of those at the bottom.' 86 But
unlike Rawls, we are not concerned with addressing ingrained societal
problems of entrenched poverty and inequality. 187 Ultimately, since Justice
Thomas ordinarily chooses not to speak at oral argument, due to his disdain
for speaking and because he believes his colleagues speak too much, it is
difficult to argue that, overall, it makes up for the highly disparate effect of
the structure of oral argument whereby the liberal justices are being given
less of an opportunity to speak.
More generally, one could argue that the difference in winners versus
losers is driven by the fact that the liberal Justices ordinarily participate more
at oral argument than the conservative Justices. But it is not at all clear why
an artificial structure should be imposed to increase the participation of some
Justices when their participation levels are a choice-particularly given that
the conservative Justices already dominate the Court in terms of their
numbers. The only alternative is that judicial participation is not a choice;
that, somehow, the conservative Justices are less capable of participating,
which is both unlikely-each of the Justices are highly qualified and none
are shrinking violets-and ironic, as it relies on promoting a kind of
affirmative action for the sake of conservative Justices, all of whom are

183 See, e.g., Jeff Nesbit, The Real Reason Clarence Thomas Rarely Speaks, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 30,

2016, 12:01

AM), www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-03-30/why-clarence-thomas-rarely-speaks-

from-the-supreme-court-bench (relaying Justice Thomas's own explanation that he does not like to speak
in public due to fear of discrimination, since he grew up speaking Gullah, and learned not to speak in
public for fear that he would "be branded as poor, uneducated and disadvantaged," but also describing
how others dispute this explanation).

1

Thomas: My Colleagues Ask Too Many Questions, CBS NEWS (Apr. 6, 2012, 2:24 AM),

(saying of questions
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/thomas-my-colleagues-ask-too-many-questions
during oral argument "I don't see where that advances anything ... I think that when somebody's talking,
somebody ought to listen.") (reporting the Associated Press quoting Justice Thomas).
185 Id.
186 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72 (2009) ("Social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are ... to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.").
187 Id. (describing his seminal theory of distributive justice, which also holds that "Each person is to
have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar
system of liberty for all" and "offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.").
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generally opposed to such concepts. 88 In other contexts, the conservative
Justices are quick to decry attempts to equalize speech as "wholly foreign to
the First Amendment."' 8
Regardless of whether equalizing the opportunities of the Justices to
participate is a worthy goal, the fact that in this new, ostensibly equal, format
the conservative Justices are on average "more equal" 190 than the liberal
Justices sits uncomfortably with Roberts's claim to be a "neutral umpire."' 9
Others have noted that some of the differences between the telephonic
cases and the in-person cases appeared to rest, in part, on gender
differences.1 92 Most strikingly, nine of the eleven instances in which the
Chief Justice interrupted a Justice, he interrupted a female Justice. Gender
differences also arguably arose in terms of participation more generally, as
Leah Litman and Jacobi note:
The three justices who were allowed to speak the most in the very
politically salient cases-the two cases about the president and one
about access to contraception under the Affordable Care Act-were
conservative men . . . The justices who received the three longest
individual questioning periods were also all conservative men .... By
contrast, the justices who received the three shortest questioning
periods that the chief justice ended were all liberal women.' 93
It is difficult to disentangle the effects of gender and ideology on the
Court due to the fact that, during the period under study, all the female
Justices were appointed by Democratic presidents and three of the four
liberal Justices were female. It is no coincidence that the liberal camp has
gender diversity and the conservative camp does not: Trump was the first
Republican president since President Reagan to nominate a female Justice.
We do not want to fault Chief Justice Roberts for any gender disparities that
1"

See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting,

joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas) (arguing that the majority was wrong to not apply
strict scrutiny to analyzing the constitutionality of considering race in university admissions); Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (7-1 opinion joined by all conservative Justices) (holding
that race can be considered by universities in admissions only if such consideration can pass strict
scrutiny).
18 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (in relation to campaign fmance laws aimed at
equalizing speech, the majority said: "But the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment."); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 US 310, 349-50 (2010) (quoting

Buckley, 424 U.S. 1).
190 In George Orwell's allegorical novel Animal Farm, it was proclaimed by the pigs who controlled
the farm "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others." GEORGE ORWELL,
ANIMAL FARM 100 (1945).
191

Roberts: 'My Job is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat', supra note 17 ("The role

of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role.
Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.").
192 Litman, supra note 129 ("The Chief Justice only interrupted liberal Justices, and nine of the 11
interruptions were of women Justices"); Leah Litman & Tonja Jacobi, Does John Roberts Need to Check
His Own Biases?, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/opinion/johnroberts-supreme-court.html ("[O]n 11 occasions, the chief justice interrupted or cut off another justice.
Every one of those 11 occasions involved justices who were appointed by Democratic presidents, and
nine of the II involved female justices.").
193 Litman & Jacobi, supra note 192.
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may simply be a product of ideological differences, although he certainly
does not seem to have heeded the call for greater sensitivity to gender
differentials. 194 When we turn to the question of interruptions and
terminations of interchanges, a gender pattern becomes clear.1 9 But in our
results so far, looking at the extent of participation in interchanges, we do
not observe any gender effect-Justice Breyer is at least as disadvantaged by
the change to the telephonic forum as are the female liberal Justices. As such,
we conclude that most of the effect is ideological.
How These Changes Were Reflected in the Content of Oral Argument
in the Telephonic Era
In addition to analyzing how the telephonic format changed the balance
of participation in oral argument, we are also interested in how the new
format changed how the Justices use their speaking time. Figure 5 does this
by breaking down the content of the Justices' participation at oral argument
by the rate of questions and non-questions (comments).
3.

194 Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 63, at 1484-85 (calling for the Chief to play a more active role in
mitigating the gender difference they identify); Garrett Epps, Not Everyone Is Happy With the Supreme
Court's Live Broadcasts, ATLANTIC (May 12, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2020/05/lyle-denniston-despises-supreme-courts-new-format/611515 (quoting Lyle Denniston that in the
telephonic cases, Roberts "was cutting people off not only in mid-sentence but also in mid-thought, both
justices and counsel .... It may be what I'm asking for is just a degree of humility from the chiefjustice.").
19 See infra Part IV.D.
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Figure 5: Net change in content of participation: Differences in questions
& non-questions' 9 6
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Here we utilize the same methodology as in Figure 4 (telephonic cases
minus in-person 2019 cases) to analyze the nature of the Justices'
participation in the different forums.' 9 7 We used an algorithm to classify each
sentence spoken by the Justices as either a question or a comment.1 98 Using
a similar method, Jacobi and Sag noted that "even while the Justices are
talking more [in the modern era], they are not asking significantly more
questions. Rather, they are posing ... "non-questions"-that is, they are
making statements and comments."199 They show that in the last quarter
century, oral argument has increasingly become a vehicle for judicial
advocacy, whereby Justices use their participation at oral argument to
196

Note that there are often multiple questions and non-questions in a single speech event.
The questions number excludes when Chief Justice Roberts says, for example, "Justice Breyer?"
to pass the baton to the next speaker in telephonic oral argument. It also excludes what we call the "Ferris
Bueller moments" when a Justice or advocate is nonresponsive to being called upon -in such cases, we
exclude both the words of the traffic management and the dead time as Chief Justice Roberts waits,
sometimes hopelessly, for a response.
1
Having studied the transcripts from hundreds of oral arguments, we are confident that the court
reporters use question marks in an appropriate and consistent manner. We note, however, that our method
will only count questions that are not cut short by an interruption. However, the number of interruptions
is randomly distributed between questions and comments and a small enough proportion of speech
episodes as to not dramatically affect the ratio of questions to comments.
'9 Jacobi & Sag, supra note 46, at 1205.
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promote the side of the case that they ultimately vote in favor of, and to rebut
the side of the case that they ultimately disfavor.200 One way the Justices do
so is to direct questions to the side they ultimately vote for and to direct
comments-often in the form of rebuttal-to the side they ultimately vote
against.201
It is apparent from the notable difference in size of the two graphs in
Figure 5 that while to some extent conservative Justices used their additional
time in the telephonic cases to ask more questions, they used considerably
more of that extra time to engage in judicial advocacy through making
comments. Although the number of questions asked by the conservative
Justices increased, on average, by 1.6, the conservative Justices' comments
increased, on average, by 8.2. In contrast, all of the liberal Justices registered
fewer questions and made fewer comments-with the exception of Justice
Ginsburg, who posed 4.6 more comments than she did previously. Note,
however, that Justice Ginsburg's increase in comments was smaller than the
increases of all of the conservative Justices. On average, questions by the
liberal Justices declined by 1.6 per Justice per argument and their comments
declined by 4.3 on average. The overall effect is that with considerably more
opportunity to speak in the telephonic hearings, the conservative Justices
used that time to engage in judicial advocacy by making additional
comments rather than asking more questions. In contrast, the liberal Justices
lost such opportunities to influence the arguments.
C.

TRENDS WITHIN THE TELEPHONIC CASES

In this Section, we shift from comparing the telephonic cases to the in2 02
person cases to examining, in detail, variation within the telephonic cases.
With only ten telephonic arguments, we are able to examine judicial activity
case by case. In this way, we can see the overall impact of the inequality
described above, for each ideological bloc, case by case. However, it should
be noted that, unlike the previous two Sections, this Section is more open to
interpretation as to whether the effect is unequal-we present arguments for
and against a finding of inequality between the two ideological camps, case
by case. But that does not undermine the quite dramatic discrepancies found
in the previous two Sections when viewed at the individual Justice level.
As we compare telephonic cases, we divide the analysis between the
petitioner and the respondent arguments (including amici in support for each
side). We do this because it is well established that the Court treats petitioner
and respondent differently in certain respects. For instance, petitioners win
approximately two thirds of the time-an effect that has been explained by
showing that the Justices "aggressively grant" cert to cases where they wish
to overturn the decision below.203 In addition, the literature demonstrates that
200 Id. at 1235. See also Johnson et al., supra note 48, at 258 (showing that Justices speak more words
to the side they are more likely to vote against on the merits).
201 Jacobi & Sag, supra note 46, at 1172.
202 In their early look at the telephonic cases, Litman and Jacobi argued that the unequal impact of
the way that the Chief Justice ran oral argument in the telephonic cases is most apparent in politically
salient cases. Litman & Jacobi, supra note 192.
203 Robert L. Boucher & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision Makers:
Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824, 829 (1995) (finding that
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Justices treat petitioners and respondents differently, depending on whom
they ultimately vote in favor of.2 4 With these points in mind, we turn to the
analysis.
First, we examine the duration of each Justice's speaking time at oral
argument using Justice-advocate pairs. Figures 6 and 7 show the results for
petitioner's and respondent's time, respectively. The x-axes show the
telephonic cases in the order in which they were heard. The y-axes show the
duration of each argument, broken down by Justice. Note that Justice Kagan
did not participate in the second case (USAID v. AOSI) and Justice
Sotomayor did not participate in the final case (Colorado v. Baca).

every vinson Court justice is significantly less likely to vote for certiorari if he eventually votes to affirm
the lower court's decision). See also Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic
Auditing in a PoliticalHierarchy:An Information Model ofthe Supreme Court's CertiorariDecisions,94
AM. POL. SCt. REV. 101, 113 (2000) (showing that conservative higher courts will review liberal lower
courts but not conservative lower courts, and vice versa). In an era when the Justices only take between
70 and 80 cases per Term, this makes sense in terms of resource management; rather than using up one
of their few slots to uphold a decision already made by a lower court the Justices focus on changing
outcomes with which they disagree. For the sake of concision, when there is little difference between the
Justices' behavior during towards the petitioner and respondent, we aggregate the analysis and show only
the overall effect. However, we still report variation between how petitioner and respondent are treated
in any oral argument.
24 See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 53, at 578 (making clear that when Justices use harsher language
towards one side they are less likely to vote in favor of that party).

2021]

441

Oral Argument in the Time of Covid

Figure 6: Justice time in individual telephonic cases: Petitioner's time,
by pairs
6M-"Psll aga

Afls - Pebrtiseer

84

8

84

9
4

g684-

4-

320

020

-

9Cases in order

.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7i
Cases In order

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cases in order

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

n tRKnee

-K an

Kavanagh - Pedtecer

er

8-

8-

81

6-

6

6

H..I ihhu 3: I.iII
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Cases in order

10

1 2 3 4 5 6 789
Cases Inorder

I

4

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cases In order

10

Thnorss
8

8-

g6-

g6-

1 23 4 5 6 7 8 910
Cases

In order

9 10

.Pedlors-

86-

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Cases in order

10

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cases inorder

Southern CaliforniaInterdisciplinaryLaw Journal

442

[Vol. 30:399

Figure 7: Justice time in individual telephonic cases: Respondent's time,
by pairs
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Figures 6 and 7 show that there was enormous variance both between
cases and within cases, in terms of the amount of time spent speaking to the
petitioner and respondent within cases. Justice Alito was so active during the
respondent's argument in Little Sisters that we had to use a different scale in
Figure 7 to capture the more than sixteen minutes in which he spoke during
the one side of that argument. This extraordinary dominance in this
controversial case by Justice Alito actually drives the overall result that he
dominated telephonic arguments. 205 As we demonstrate below, however, the
dominance of the conservative coalition in the telephonic cases is not the
product of any single case.
Existing research shows that Justices systematically talk more during the
time of the advocate whom they ultimately rule against. 2 06 Little Sisters was
a challenge to the Trump administration's expansion of the religious
exception to the Affordable Care Act's requirement that group health
insurance plans cover contraceptive services-without giving notice or
soliciting public comment, the administration expanded the exemption to
include a "moral" exemption. 207 Given existing findings, it is perhaps
205 If we exclude the Little Sisters argument and Chief Justice Robert's traffic management activity,
Justice Alito comes in slightly behind Justice Sotomayor.
206 Jacobi & Sag, supra note 46, at 1227; Johnson et al., supra note 48, at 258.
207

Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2367 (2020).
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unsurprising that seventeen of the twenty-two minutes that Justice Alito
spent talking in this case were directed to respondent, the side arguing in
favor of the rights of women to have contraceptive coverage. Four and a half
minutes into his lengthy dialogue with the advocate he would later vote
against-and fourteen speech episodes, five questions, and thirty comments
in-Justice Alito stated "If I could ask one other question." 2 08 Chief Justice
Roberts then permitted him just short of thirteen additional minutes of
dialogue, including twelve more speech episodes, four questions, and
twenty-one comments. 209
In contrast, when Justice Sotomayor questioned petitioner's advocatewhom she ultimately voted against-after two minutes and fourty seconds,
two questions, and eleven comments, she appeared to be similarly asking for
more time, but we can only infer this because the only words she was able to
get out before she was interrupted by the Chief were "[o]ne last --".210 Once
again the Chief treated Justice Sotomayor very differently, limiting her
opportunity to speak and being far more generous with his conservative
colleague. To be sure that comparing Justice Sotomayor's interaction with
the petitioner's advocate to Justice Alito's interaction with the respondent's
advocate is not misleading, we can instead compare Justice Sotomayor's and
Justice Alito's treatment of respondent. Once again, the Chief's disparate
treatment is evident. Justice Sotomayor was permitted four and a half
minutes to Alito's more than sixteen minutes, six questions to his nine, and
thirty-four comments to his fifty-one before being cut off by the Chief as she
said "[s]o if -- ".2" She was then permitted an additional thirty-two seconds
of dialogue with the advocate before being cut off by the Chief again. 1 2
It is not surprising that the ideological differences between Justice Alito
and Justice Sotomayor would manifest in oral argument. Indeed, the general
tendency of the Justices to speak more in disagreement than agreement in
oral argument has been well established.2 13 Nor is it surprising that these
differences would be on stark display in such a controversial case as Little
Sisters. What is new, however, if not entirely surprising, is that we provide
evidence that Chief Justice Roberts used his administrative role in an
ideologically imbalanced manner. What our data demonstrates is that the
format he selected and his control of oral argument in the telephonic hearings
gave significantly more volume to conservative voices than liberal voices.
This is a strong claim to make, so to corroborate that the inequality
created by the Chief during the telephonic cases is ideological, the next two
figures explore that issue more deeply. Figure 8 examines the overall
difference in the balance of time utilized by conservative Justices versus
liberal Justices in the telephonic cases. 214
208 Transcript of Oral Argument at 71, Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v.

Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) (No. 19-431).
209 Note that we distinguish between questions and comments at the sentence level and that a single
speech episode will often contain multiple of each.
210

Id. at 20.

211 Id. at 79.
212

Id. at 80.

213 See supra text accompanying note 200.
214 In unreported figures that separate out the time of Respondent, the gap between the conservatives

and liberals is even more extreme.
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Figure 8: Balance of time between conservative and liberal Justices, by
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Figure 8 shows the balance of time in each oral argument, divided
between the conservative and liberal Justices, with the cases in order along
the x-axis and the percentage of time of each ideological camp on the y-axis.
Note that, because the difference is measured in percentage of the argument,
the two lines are a mirror image, centered on the 50% line.2 1 5
Here we observe that the overall dominance of the conservative Justices
in the cases in aggregate above is not a product of a single, particularly salient
case. Rather, the conservative Justices commanded a larger proportion of
time in every single case of the ten telephonic cases, and significantly so in

2'5 As noted in the figure, Justice Kagan did not participate in Agencyfor International Development
and Justice Sotomayor did not participate in Baca.
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eight of the ten.216 Notably, this conservative dominance includes five cases
directly affecting the 2020 presidential election. 217
There is another way to analyze this question, which makes this last
result appear less ideologically biased in favor of the conservative Justices.
With five Justices nominated by Republican presidents and four Justices
nominated by Democratic presidents during the time period examined here,
the Court was not ideologically balanced. Normally, when analyzing oral
arguments, this difference can be ignored because Justice Thomas rarely
contributes. But with Justice Thomas choosing to participate in the
telephonic oral arguments, arguably we should discount the time of the
conservative Justices by normalizing for an ideologically balanced Court.
Figure 9 does so, replicating Figure 8 by taking the average duration for the
participating liberal Justices and the same for conservatives and converting
it to a percentage. This normalizes the Court to a panel of equal numbers of
liberals and conservatives and accounts for both the five-to-four imbalance
on the then-Court and the recusals of Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor
in USAID v. AOSI2 18 and Coloradov Baca,219 respectively.

216 The two cases in which the conservative justices only slightly won out on the balance of time
concerned jurisdiction over American tribe members for crimes committed within the historical tribe

boundaries-McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2452 (2020)-and religious discrimination in
employment-Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2049 (2020). In the
former, the Court ultimately ruled in favor of the liberal side of the argument, refusing to infer the
abolishment of tribal sovereignty; in the latter, the Court ruled in favor of the liberal side of the argument,
expanding the "ministerial exception" under the religion clauses of the First Amendment to proscribe
adjudication of employment discrimination claims of teachers of non-religious subjects in Catholic
schools, but it did so in a coalition of seven Justices that included two of the liberal Justices. As such,
these two cases were seemingly less ideologically divided than many of the others.
217

Including consolidated cases. Trump v. Mazars U.S.A., LLP, 140

S.

Ct. 2019, 2026 (2020)

(assessing congressional subpoenas of the president), Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2420 (2020)
(assessing the limits of state criminal investigations of the president), Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct.
2316, 2320 (2020) (addressing the constitutionality of faithless electors), and Colo. Dep't of State v. Baca,

140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020) (same).
218 Agency for Int'l Dev. V. All. For Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc, 140 S. Ct. 2082, 2086 (2020).
219 Baca, 140 S. Ct. at 2316.
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Figure 9: Balance of time between conservative and liberal Justices, for
a normalized Court, by pair
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The results in Figure 9 look far more ideologically balanced than they
do in Figure 8. The conservative Justices still dominate in cases such as Little
Sisters, but speak less in Lady of Guadalupe and have equal participation to
the liberal Justices in four of the ten cases.226
So which figure best represents the true level of equality in the
telephonic cases? The answer depends, once again, on how one views the
purpose of oral argument. We must query: why is it that we care that some
Justices are permitted more time than others? Obviously, it matters in terms
of an intrinsic sense of fairness, but we are not concerned with the First
Amendment rights of the individual Justices; rather, we are concerned with
who and what the Justices represent, and whether what they represent gets
fairly treated and equally heard.
The advocates represent each side of an issue but, ultimately, they
represent their clients. This means advocates may sometimes undermine the
interest of the overall class that the case represents in terms of the policy

220 United States PTO v. Bookingcom B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2301 (2020); Agency for Int'l Dev., 140
S. Ct. at 2086.; McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2452; Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2026.
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issue, in order to achieve a specific outcome for the party in the case.2 We
know that Justices often act as advocates for one side or the other during oral
argument, which raises concerns about judicial independence. But the
advantage of judicial advocacy is that the Justices represent those positions
without the same priority of the individual. Rather, they are focused on the
policy outcome that affects both the individual and others more generally.
The ultimate purpose of oral argument is to give each side a fair hearing,
and to make it clear that due process has been served in the form of a public
hearing of the issue whereby both sides can make their claim, be heard, and
be considered. 222 Scholars have recognized the legitimacy-enhancing
function of oral argument, with arguments acting as a signal to the parties
and the broader public that the Court is performing its constitutionallymandated function by hearing and engaging in arguments from both sides. 3
This goes beyond the disputes at hand: oral argument allows the public to
see the Court as an impartial tribunal exploring issues of national importance
through a balanced adjudicative process.224 Accordingly, it is appropriate to
look at the time in which Justices of each ideological camp engage in
dialogue with the advocates. As such, although it is sometimes appropriate
to normalize such an analysis, 2 it is not apt in this instance given the Chief
Justice's role in shaping the time allocated to each Justice during the
telephonic oral arguments.
As noted at the beginning of this Section, when comparing inequality at
the ideological bloc level rather than at the individual Justice level, the
results depend more on what the reader perceives is the ultimate goal of oral
argument. This was not true of our analysis at the individual Justice level,
which showed stark differences between how each Justice was treated in the
May 2020 hearings. We believe that both sets of findings raise concerns
about the legitimacy of the Court, as the ideological inequities revealed
during telephonic oral argument risk harming the Court's very legitimacy as
an institution engaged in due process and impartial adjudication.

221 For instance, in Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S.
(2019), in arguing that the death penalty should
not be applied to his client due to his brain damage that arose from a series of strokes, which left him
unable to remember committing the crime that he was convicted of, the advocate for petitioner, Bryan A.
Stevenson, went to great lengths to differentiate many other similar conditions to which his argument
could otherwise apply, so as to make his argument seem less expansive. Transcript of Oral Argument,
__ (2019) (No. 17-7505).
222 Sullivan & Canty, supranote 34, at 1011; see discussion supra Part I.A.4.

Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S.

223 See, e.g., id. at 1025; Jacobi & Sag, supranote 46, at 1168 (Oral argument is "the only opportunity
for outsiders to directly witness the behavior of the justices of the highest court," and has an important
role in the transparency of the Court itself). Justices have also made the same point. See, e.g., CHARLES
E. WYZANSKI, JR., WHEREAS-A JUDGE'S PREMISES: ESSAYS IN JUDGMENT, ETHICS, AND THE LAW 61
(1965) (quoting Justice Brandeis as saying "The reason the public thinks so much of the . . . Supreme
Court is that they are almost the only people in Washington who do their own work.").
224 Sullivan & Canty, supra note 34, at 1012.
225 For example, Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 63, at 1462, normalized by gender on the Court when

looking at interruptions, since there has never been close to a majority of women on the Court. But that
is differentiable because there is no theory that we know of that suggests that men and women ought to
be equally interrupted in aggregate as representative camps, making it appropriate to interrupt the female
Justices on the current Court three times as often as the male Justices, and thus inappropriate to normalize,
as here.
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THE ABRUPTNESS OF THE TERMINATION

Our final inquiry concerns how interchanges between Justices and
advocates end. We ask: Does the Justice choose to end the interchange? Or
does the Chief Justice intervene to end the interchange? Are there patterns as
to when the Chief Justice intervenes and when he does not? And do these
patterns follow the same ideological lines as the previous results? It may be
the case that the Chief Justice needs to end many interchanges to keep the
arguments from going even longer in the telephonic cases, but it is hard to
justify this practice if it is handled inequitably. The analyses that follow most
directly allow us to assess the extent to which the Chief Justice's actions
shaped Justices' participation.
In the next three figures, we compare terminations of interchanges in
2018 and 2019 in-person cases to terminations in telephonic cases. We
differentiate between three different possible endings to an interchange.
First, a Justice can be "cut off," or interrupted by another Justice. 226 In the
telephonic cases, those cutoffs are only done by the Chief Justice. Second,
an advocate can be cut off.227 In the telephonic cases, once again this is done
by the Chief Justice, since the other Justices do not jump in to speak out of
order. Note that the Justice involved in the interchange often interrupts an
advocate, but that interruption does not constitute a cut off because an
interchange is an ongoing back-and-forth between two participants; this may
include multiple interruptions as long as a third party does not become
involved, at which point the interchange ends and another begins. In the inperson cases, there is more variation. Typically, another Justice interrupts the
interchange between the advocate and the Justice, but in the rarer case of an
interchange between two Justices, an advocate or the Chief could step in,
ending the intra-Justice interchange. Third, and finally, an interchange can
end in a "take over," when the next Justice begins speaking-that is, there is
no interruption. Once again, in the in-person cases, any individual can take
over the dialogue after another has spoken. In the telephonic cases, that next
Justice is always the Chief Justice, who introduces the following Justice. The
difference between the Chief Justice taking over versus cutting off is whether
he does so via an interruption.228 There were seventy-four instances
(approximately 30% of the total) where these takeovers involved a voluntary
passing of the baton, often by saying, "Thank you." 229 Others involved the
226 An interruption by the advocate does not terminate a Justice-advocate interchange, it is simply
part of it. In theory, the advocates should "[n]ever interrupt a Justice." CLERK OF THE CT., supra note 79,
at 9. Nonetheless, advocate interruptions are common. See Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 63, at 1437
(finding 7,239 interruptions of Justices between 2004 and 2015-note that this number includes Justiceto-Justice interruptions, but that is a small minority of occurrences).
227 Remember that both figures show pair behavior, not simply individual behavior, and thus
incorporate the participation of the advocate with whom each Justice is engaged.
228 Note that Litman explores a similar concept, but her definition may be slightly more subjective
than ours. She defines an interruption in the telephonic hearings as when "the Chief Justice interrupted
another Justice's remarks or ended their questioning period before an advocate had a chance to respond
to the question." Litman, supra note 129, at 23. Judgments as to whether an advocate "had a chance to
respond to the question" need to be formalized before they can be applied by algorithms to large datasets.
229 Our count of seventy-four does not include instances where the Chief ended the argument session
with a "thank you" or where the Chief interrupted an associate justice to ask if he or she had anything
else to ask and the associate responded by saying "no" and then thanking the Chief.
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Chief unilaterally indicating that a Justice's term has ended without
interruption.
First, we analyze the in-person cases to determine how interchanges
normally terminate. Figure 10 shows the 2019 in-person cases and Figure 11
shows the 2018 in-person cases. The two figures display the number of
occurrences of any given termination on the x-axes and the three categories
of termination on the y-axes. It shows there is variation among the Justices;
23 0
we can see at a glance how involved each Justice is at oral argument.
Figure 10: Pair terminations in 2019 in-person oral arguments
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230 Obviously, Justice Thomas barely registers but it is also apparent that Justice Gorsuch and Chief
Justice Roberts are less active in dialogue with advocates than are the other Justices. In 2018, Justice
Sotomayor was the most active, with 338 interchanges terminated, followed by Justice Kagan, at 327. In
the 2019 in-person cases, Justice Kagan is the most active, with 239 interchanges/terminations, followed
by Justice Kavanaugh with 208, and Justice Sotomayor with 201. Justices Ginsburg and Alito are also
relatively active, at 193 and 186, respectively. Justice Gorsuch is the least active at 118, other than Justice
Thomas. Note that the lower numbers of interchanges terminated in the 2019 in-person cases reflect the
lower number of in-person cases that were heard in 2018.
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Figure 11: Pair terminations in 2018 in-person oral arguments
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When we look at the different types of interchange terminations in the
in-person cases, while each Justice is interrupted occasionally, there are no
striking inequalities. There are differences-Justices Kavanaugh and
Sotomayor are interrupted the most, with eight and seven cutoffs,
respectively, in the 2019 in-person cases; in the 2018 cases, Justice
Sotomayor is cut off the most, with a very high thirteen cutoffs, followed by
Justice Kagan with five, followed by Justices Alito and Breyer, with four
each. Even though Justice Sotomayor is seemingly treated differently than
the other Justices, with as many cutoffs as the next three highest Justices
combined, each of these numbers must be put in the context of occurring in
a Term in which each of these Justices were involved in hundreds of
interchanges being terminated. Every Justice had the majority of their
interactions terminated by a take over rather than by a cutoff. If we look at
the proportion of terminations ending in a take over, the range in 2019 was
0.54 for Justice Breyer to 0.64 for Justice Ginsburg; the range in 2018 was
0.60 for Chief Justice Roberts followed by Justice Sotomayor at 0.67
(excluding Justice Thomas, who was at 1.00, but he only had one
interchange, which happened to end in a take over).
Even though Justice Sotomayor seems to be treated with less respect than
her colleagues in some ways,231 importantly, there is no obvious ideological
23 On the relationship between politeness and interruptions, as well as other forms of politeness
identified at oral argument, see Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 63, at 1442; Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag,
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division, and no indicia that the female Justices are being treated differently
as a group. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the telephonic cases.
Figure 12 shows the divergence, applying the same analysis to the telephonic
cases.
Figure 12: Pair terminations in telephonic oral arguments
Gineburg

Breyer

Justice cut off

Justice cut off

-

Adv

cut off

Take over

-

-

-

Take over

Take over

0

cut off

-

Adv

Adv cut off

-

-

-

Justice cut off

0

5 10 15 20

0 5 10 15 20

5 10 15 20

K~avansaug

Gorsuchv
Adv cut off

Adv cut off

over

Take over

-

-

Take

-

Take over

0

Justice cut off

-

fl

Adv cut off

Justice cut off

-

Justice cut off

0

0 5 10 15 20

10 1520

51 1

20

Thm"
Justice cut off

Adv cut off

Adv cut off

Take over

Take over

-

-

-

Take over

-

-

Adv cut off

-

-

Justice cut off

Justice cut off

0

5 10 15 20

Ooecoe

0 5 10 1520

0

5 10 15 20

OmJrunco

The results are quite different in Figure 12 than they were in Figures 10
and 11. Specifically, it shows a much higher level of variation in the Chief
Justice deciding whether a Justice is permitted to continue their dialogue
with the advocate.
Terminating a Justice's dialogue by interrupting them may strike some
as an issue of politeness and decorum, but the real question that the manner
of termination informs is how much latitude the Chief Justice accords to
different Justices. The more a Justice's dialogue is cut short by an
interruption, the less deference or consideration their views would appear to
warrant. This is more than symbolic: being cut off directly stops a Justice
from continuing his or her dialogue with an advocate. Thus, Figure 12
illustrates an important facet of the differences in the latitude the Chief
accorded each of the Associate Justices-and indeed, himself. A brief glance
at the data shows that each of the bottom bars, representing take overs, is the
largest of the three categories for all of the Justices except one: Justice
Sotomayor. Also of note is that the other two Justices whose bottom bars are
even close to any other bar are the two other female (and liberal) Justices,
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan. To be fair, these figures do not show the
Politeness and Formality in Supreme Court Oral Argument, SCOTUS OA (Aug 27, 2018),
https://scotusoa.com/politeness-and-formality.
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context in which a Justice's interchanges were terminated. The figures also
do not show the number of times the speaker voluntarily terminated an
interchange. However, the figures do suggest that the Chief used his
authority to end Justices' dialogue with attorneys unevenly. It is worth
exploring this in greater detail.
In the telephonic cases, Justice Sotomayor was cut off by the Chief in
six of the twenty-six terminations to her interchanges-or 23% of the time.
In the entirety of the telephonic cases, only two other Justices had any of
their interchanges with the advocates terminated by the Chief-Justices
Breyer and Alito. Each occurred only once. The Chief interrupted Justice
Sotomayor three times as often as he interrupted all of the other Justices
combined in the telephonic hearings. Jacobi and Schweers showed that male
Justices interrupt female Justices disproportionately often and that Justice
Sotomayor is consistently the most interrupted Justice by both advocates and
other Justices. 32 Figure 12 suggests that the seemingly rigid formal structure
of the telephonic cases did not alleviate this trend-telephonic cases simply
gave the Chief Justice more control over the flow of conversation.
Further, even more of Justice Sotomayor's dialogues with advocates
ended with the Chief intervening. In addition to the six terminations when
the Chief directly interrupted Justice Sotomayor midsentence, the Chief also
interrupted the advocate while in dialogue with Justice Sotomayor twelve
times, representing 46% of her interchanges. Only eight, or 31%, of
Sotomayor's interchanges ended in take overs. This was not because Justice
Sotomayor's interchanges with the attorneys were longer than other Justice's
interchanges, as shown above in Figures 4, 6, and 7. Thus, Chief Justice
Roberts actively intervened to cut short discussion between Justice
Sotomayor and an advocate 69% of the time she was engaged in any dialogue
with an advocate.
Justices Ginsburg and Kagan were not themselves interrupted by the
Chief, but almost half of their interchanges with advocates involved the
advocate being cut off while answering one of their questions-twelve out
of twenty-six (46%) for Justice Ginsburg and eleven out of twenty-six (42%)
for Justice Kagan. As such, the other two female Justices' participation at
oral argument was stymied even when they were not directly interrupted.
The treatment of the male Justices stands in direct contrast. Despite
being the most active Justice in the telephonic cases, Justice Alito was
interrupted by the Chief far less often than the Chief interrupted any of the
female Justices: Justice Alito had well under one-third of his interchanges
with the advocates end in a cutoff of the advocate-eight out of twenty-eight
(29%). Similarly, Justices Kavanaugh and Thomas each had only one-quarter
of their interchanges end in a cutoff-seven out of twenty-eight each (25%);
and Justice Gorsuch had even less, with fewer than one-fifth of his
interchanges ending in the Chief cutting off his dialogue with the advocatefive out of twenty-six (19%).

23

Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 63, at 1437, 1468, 1470.
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In every measure other than terminations, Justice Breyer was the
"biggest loser" in the telephonic cases and was clearly in the liberal camp.2 33
But in this one respect, the end of Justice Breyer's interchanges did not look
like that of the female liberal Justices, but like the male conservative Justices'
interchanges. This suggests that the gender effect in interruptions at oral
argument that Jacobi and Schweers identified is alive and well, despite calls
on the Chief to improve the gender balance on the Court, 23 4 and that initial
observers were correct that gender was at play in the diversity of the Chief's
treatment of the other Justices in the telephonic cases 23s-at least with
respect to interruptions. Note that Justice Breyer voluntarily ended many of
his telephonic interchanges and was more succinct than usual. However,
while it is possible that the male Justices were more likely to voluntarily cede
their time, the data indicate that the female Justices frequently wanted to
continue an interchange and were constrained by the Chief Justice.
Our final indicia of the Chief's selectivity in running the telephonic oral
arguments is in the duration of the terminal speech episode, or final spoken
portion, in an interchange. We want to know how an interchange ends-in a
cutoff or a take over-and the substantiality of the last remark when not
interrupted. This is important because even when a speaker is not technically
interrupted, they might be effectively disrupted. For instance, if a Justice asks
an advocate if they have an answer to a complicated question, the advocate
might begin by responding, "Yes, Your Honor." We would then expect the
advocate to extrapolate, but if another participant begins speaking before the
advocate has a chance to reply with substance, the advocate may as well have
been interrupted. The justice may have asked a question or made a comment
but not received a substantive response from the advocate. By measuring the
duration of the last remark, we can better understand substantive intrusion
on dialogue.

233 See supra Figures 4 and 5 and associated text.
234 Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 63 at 1484-85.
235 Litman, supra note 129; Litman & Jacobi, supra note 192.
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Figure 13: Duration of terminal speech episode in interchanges, by pair
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Figure 13 shows the duration of each Justice's terminal speech episode
in an interchange.236 Specifically, it shows an average for the telephonic
cases, the 2019 in-person cases, and the 2018 in-person cases, from left to
right. Note that Justice Thomas does not appear in the middle graph as he did
not speak in the 2019 in-person cases.
Once again, we see a change in the duration of terminal speech episodes
from the in-person cases to the telephonic cases. In in-person cases, the
liberal Justices included more substance in their terminal speech episodes
than in telephonic cases. In fact, in the in-person cases, the liberal Justices
excelled at this tactic over the conservative Justices: the ideological ordering
is only disrupted by the appearance of Chief Justice Roberts in the top half
of the graph in 2019 and Justice Kavanaugh in 2018. In contrast, in the
telephonic cases, the liberal Justices are more likely to be in the bottom half
of the rankings. The one exception is Justice Ginsburg. She went from
ranking first in getting substantive answers to her final question to fourth in
the telephonic cases. In telephonic cases, she sits behind Justice Alito and
Justice Thomas, who once again benefit most from the switch to the
telephonic format, with Justice Gorsuch and the Chief himself close behind.
Justice Kavanaugh also appears near the bottom of the telephonic cases
in duration of final speech episode, but this was also true in the 2019 inperson cases, albeit less-so in the 2018 cases. That is, Justice Kavanaugh was
never particularly adept at ensuring that his final questions were
substantively addressed. The liberal Justices, in contrast, played the game of
in-person oral arguments well. However, this did not translate to telephonic
cases, where much depends on Chief Justice Roberts choosing which Justice
will have their questions answered substantively.

"h Not including the traffic management interchanges of the Chief Justice.
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By averaging the duration of terminal speech episodes of each Justice in
the 2018 and 2019 in-person cases, and comparing them to the telephonic
cases, each of the liberal Justices dropped between 1.5 to 3.5 rankings of
duration. Once again, Justice Sotomayor is the Justice most disadvantaged
by the Chief's selective approach in the telephonic cases, followed by Justice
Ginsburg, and then Justices Kagan and Breyer. In contrast, Justices Alito,
Gorsuch, Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts all benefited; only Justice
Kavanaugh among the conservatives lost ground-but only one spot on
average.
So, not only are the liberal Justices cut off more, as we saw above, but,
for whatever reason, their interchanges with the advocates ended more
abruptly than those of the conservative Justices. 2 3 7 And once again, the
liberal women in particular are most disadvantaged. Liberal female Justices
may also be treated less politely-shorter durations could indicate more
abrupt endings to final speech episodes. The length of an interchange
indicates the substance of the Justice's dialogue with the advocate; the length
of the final speech episode in the interchange is in many ways about
courtesy-it shows who is given leeway and deference to get their questions
answered in any substantial sense. But the disruption has a substantive effect,
limiting the capacity of the Justice to continue their dialogue with the
advocate. By using his additional power under the telephonic forum
structure, Chief Justice Roberts's actions promoted the ability of Justices
Thomas and Alito to participate, and mitigated the influence of Justices
Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Breyer. As such, the appearance of
equality given by the left panel of Figure 2, which displays pairs'
interchanges in the telephonic cases, does not fully hold up.
Our analysis illustrates the difference between formal equalitycaptured by the number of interchanges-and substantive equality-as
measured in a variety of ways, from duration to interruptions to more than
tokenistic opportunities for advocates to answer a Justice's question. All but
the most superficial tests of equality have shown that the discretion allocated
to the Chief Justice during the telephonic oral arguments led to disparate
treatment for the Justices and groups of Justices. Chief Justice Roberts did
not apply a uniform standard across Justices. This lack of uniformity
repeatedly benefited the conservative Justices, except in regards to
interruptions, where the male Justices benefited. As such, Chief Justice
Roberts was, to some extent, playing Calvinball in the telephonic cases,
making up the rules as he went along. But in some ways this understates the
problem: Chief Justice Roberts was not even following the spirit of that
rather quixotic enterprise, Calvinball, by varying his behavior randomly;
instead, he was consistently benefiting his friends and allies.

237 We could review the transcript and make a judgement about whether the advocate had managed
to fully answer the relevant question, but this subjective approach does not scale if we are interested in
comparing telephonic to in-person oral argument.
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CONCLUSION

The shift to telephonic oral arguments was highly revealing of the
institutional dynamics of the Supreme Court and of John Roberts as Chief
Justice. While it is indisputable that some remote argument forum was
essential to permit the Court to continue to carry out its duties during the
COVID-19 crisis, the specific forum chosen was a poor substitute for inperson oral argument. Telephonic oral argument was less dynamic,
needlessly hierarchical, and, although it promised a veneer of equality
between the Justices, it functioned and was administered with a clear tilt in
favor of the conservative wing of the Court and, in some respects, in favor
of the male Justices over the female Justices. The rigid structure of the
telephonic cases obscured considerable discretion for Chief Justice Roberts
and provided him a mask of neutrality.
And yet, once the Court heard the last of the oral arguments, the
headlines that followed focused on key cases in which the Chief Justice
ostensibly gave big wins to liberal causes. 238 Most notably, in Russo v. June
Medical Services, the Chief joined the liberal Justices to strike down as
unconstitutional Louisiana's Unsafe Abortion Protection Act that required
doctors who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a nearby
hospital. 239 Yet, the Chief also gave big wins to conservatives in other cases,
including all three religious freedom challenges, including permitting the
administration to undermine women's access to contraception by once again
favoring religious freedom over bodily autonomy.240 But this does not make
Chief Justice Roberts a moderate, giving wins to each side; rather, even
where he voted for liberal outcomes, he did so in a highly conservative
manner. For instance, in June Medical, he wrote separately to "cabin[] the
plurality[,] . . . find common ground with the dissenters, including disdain
for the Supreme Court's most recent precedent[,] [and] argue[] for a return
to a system that left people seeking abortion without access to the care they
need. In his concurrence, Roberts plants a flag to mark the battlegrounds for
future abortion fights." 2 4 ' Chief Justice Roberts's goal in this case and others
238 See, e.g., Robert Costa, Trump Supporters Hope to Use Conservative Anger at Chief Justice
to
Energize
Troubled
Campaign,
WASH.
POST
(July
1,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-john-roberts-abortion-supreme-

Roberts

court/2020/06/30/3451 3f92-bae8-1lea-80b9-40ece9a70ldc

story.html ("In a remarkable stretch of

decisions over the past two weeks, Roberts has infuriated conservatives and the Trump administration by
finding that federal anti-discrimination law protects gay, bisexual and transgender workers and stopping
the president from ending the federal program that protects undocumented immigrants brought into the
country as children.").
239 June Med. Servs. L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U.S. __ (2020).
240 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2372 (2020)

2372; Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2049 (2020).
24' Gretchen Borchelt, June Medical Services v. Russo: When a "Win " is Not a Win, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jun. 30, 2020, 12:31 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposium-june-medical-services-vrusso-when-a-win-is-not-a-win; see also Justice John Roberts Joins the Supreme Court's Liberal Wing in
2020), https://www.economist.com/united-states/
(Jul. 2,
Rulings, ECONOMIST
Some Key
(arguing
2020/07/02/justice-john-roberts-joins-the-supreme-courts-liberal-wing-in-some-key-rulings
that, in June Medical, "with an eye on future cases, the chief justice proceeded to undercut the very
precedent he had relied upon to reject Louisiana's law," and more generally "[h]e is cultivating a
reputation for non-partisanship at the Supreme Court while advancing primarily conservative goals.").
But see, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, John Roberts is Just Who the Supreme Court Needed, ATLANTIC (Jul. 13,
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is about pursuing a conservative agenda within the confines of protecting the
legitimacy of the Court at a time when critics are talking about Supreme
Court expansion, 242 and he was seen as greatly benefiting from, and
interested in protecting, the Trump administration.2 3
Our analysis shows how misleading it would be to conclude from recent
cases that Chief Justice Roberts does not have a keen interest in promoting a
conservative agenda for the Supreme Court. The telephonic forum was the
perfect metaphor for John Roberts's approach to being Chief: have the
appearance of neutrality, with each Justice getting the same number of turns
at oral argument, in an order determined exogenously by the history of the
order of appointments to the Court; but in reality, subtly and strategically
promote the interests of the dominant groups that he representsconservatives and men. 244 Chief Justice Roberts is simply farsighted and
strategic enough to alter policy while maintaining plausible deniability of the
criticism that he believes: "stare decisis is for suckers." 24 5
Given that Supreme Court Justices have overwhelmingly been shown to
be ideological,24 6 perhaps it is unrealistic to expect any Chief Justice not to
behave accordingly. But the Court had a choice in which institutional
mechanism to select as an alternative to in-person oral argument. It could
have chosen a videoconferencing platform such as Zoom, which would have
permitted the Justices to virtually "raise their hands" when they had a
question. 247 That would have made the arguments much more like in-person
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/john-roberts-just-who-supreme-court-needed/
614053 (lauding Roberts for "decisively and impressively" achieving the goal of bipartisan decisionmaking, "guided by law rather than politics," and siding with the liberals in the abortion case in order to
protect stare decisis and the legitimacy of the Court).
242 See, e.g., Holly Otterbein, Liberal Groups Back Plan to Expand Supreme Court, POLITICO (June

11,

2020),

https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/l1/liberal-groups-expand-supreme-court-plan-

313037 (reporting that 350 progressive organizations have backed a plan to expand the Supreme Court in
order to weaken the conservative majority and to counter the "aggressive tactics" of the Republicans in
refusing to seat Merrick Garland and changing the filibuster rule).
243 See, e.g., Adam Serwer, The Roberts Court Completes Trump's Cover-Up, ATLANTIC (July 10,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/the-roberts-court-has-completed-trumps2020),
cover-up/614023/ ("[I]t is Roberts who is playing games, shielding Trump from accountability and
gilding the Court's image, asserting a bravery and independence that it has not actually displayed."). But
see Robert Barnes, John Roberts 's Supreme Court Power Hinges on Trump's Reelection. But Not in the
Way You Might Think, WASH. POST (July 17, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/

powerpost/paloma/daily-202/2020/07/17/daily-202-john-roberts-s-supreme-court-power-hinges-onthat
(arguing
trump-s-reelection-but-not-in-the-way-you-might-think/5f10c22f602ff1080719ddad
Roberts's power comes from being in the center, rather than from being the Chief, and agreeing that
Roberts benefited from Trump's election in 2016, arguing this aspect of his power would actually decrease

if Trump was reelected in 2020).
244 Oral argument is not the only way in which Chief Justice Roberts is said to have strategically
manipulated the Court's process, particularly since the pandemic: an inside source reports he has "exerted
unprecedented control over cases and the court's internal operations, especially after the nine were forced
to work in isolation because of Covid-19." Biskupic, supra note 6 (reporting that Roberts "maneuvered
on controversial cases in the justices' private sessions" and other strategic activity to enhance his power
at the Court).
245 See Strict Scrutiny Podcast, Stare Decisis Is for Suckers, https://strict-scrutiny-podcastshop.myshopify.com/collections/stare-decisis-is-for-suckers (last visited May 5, 2021) (with particular
attention to the section of the Strict Scrutiny podcast's store devoted to this satirical theme).
246

See supra note 13.

247 As one of us suggested. Coyle, supra note 4 (quoting Tonja Jacobi); Mark Walsh, What Will

Change When

SCOTUS Hears Oral Arguments by Phone?, A.B.A.J.

(Apr.

21,

2020),

https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-oral-arguments-by-telephonenext-month-attomeys-ponder-what-to-wear (quoting Tonja Jacobi, "I would have thought it would be
more natural for the justices to use a program like Zoom, but it didn't surprise me they opted for something
more basic ... . The court has always been reluctant to have any sort of video argument.").
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hearings, with Justices asking questions and making comments when issues
arose, rather than in the artificial order of seniority. Such a system would
have also provided a mechanism for ensuring that the Justices spoke in order
of who "got in line" first, rather than who spoke over whom 48 or who is
favored by the Chief Justice. In contrast, the telephonic argument format
employed by the Court was prone to enabling inequality by the moderator,
deliberate or otherwise.
As noted, other courts utilized videoconferencing. 249 The North Carolina
Court of Appeals is using WebEx, a more secure version of the commonly
used Zoom technology.21 Judge Lucy Inman2 5' reports that the change to
videoconferencing went smoothly for that court and that technologies such
as WebEx have advantages over a non-video-based technology; for instance,
the advocates and the judges are able to see one another's facial expressions
which improves flow and reduces interruptions. 2 The N.C. Court of
Appeals determined that the best way to continue enabling the judges to jump
in to the dialogue when desired was to physically raise their hands over video
to indicate a question. This avoids conversational disruptions in a non-rnperson forum, such as when there are delays between the video and audio, or
if a party forgets to unmute the microphone. 2 53
The N.C. Court of Appeals does not have the same aversion as the U.S.
Supreme Court to cameras in the Court: it was planning on introducing live
streaming of oral arguments prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, which simply
sped up implementation of such technology.2 5 4 But the N.C. Court ofAppeals
also does not have the same public profile as the Supreme Court and so,
presumably, does not have the same level of public interest in its oral
arguments. Despite that, approximately 100 people virtually attended the
first case conducted on WebEx, even though the case was not especially
high-profile; for some subsequent cases, the virtual audience has been
multiples of that number. 5 This may suggest that the public has a high level
of interest in the conduct of court proceedings; given that the dominant
website that provides access to Supreme Court oral argument recordings and
transcripts, Oyez, has over a seven million unique users in a year, 256 no doubt
24 Which Jacobi & Schweers show to also be highly gendered. Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 63, at
1461 (showing that not only are male Justices more likely to interrupt female Justices than fellow male
Justices, but male Justices are less likely to recognize when they have interrupted a female Justice rather
than a male Justice, and significantly more likely to hand the floor to the male Justice they have
interrupted).
249 See supra note 4.
2s0 See, e.g., Rebekah Carter, Cisco Webex vs. Zoom: Choosing the Right Team Tech, UC TODAY
(Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.uctoday.com/collaboration/video-conferencing/cisco-webex-vs-zoomcomparison ("Both Cisco and Zoom are heavily focused on security, although both companies have had
their issues with privacy and protection in the past . . . . However, Webex is more likely to be the top
choice for enterprises and large companies that host a lot of meetings with Cisco hardware.").
2 Judge Inman served on the North Carolina Special Superior Court Judge, 2010 -2014, before
joining the North Carolina Court of Appeals in 2014; she is currently a candidate for the North Carolina
Supreme Court.
252 Telephone discussion between Tonja Jacobi and Judge Lucy Inman (July 23, 2020, 11:15 AM).
Notes available from the authors.
253
254

255
256

Id.
Id.
Id.

Jacobi & Sag, supra note 84.
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the public would also be actively interested in televised Supreme Court
argument. It is equally likely that the Supreme Court continues to resist such
a move, though note that it also resisted making audio recordings promptly
available until public interest in hearing argument in Bush v. Palm Beach
Count Canvassing Board and Bush v. Gore grew too great for the Court
resist.
The Court does not need to make this difficult choice-the option to
adopt videoconferencing for oral arguments does not need to equate to
cameras in the courtroom in the sense that the Supreme Court Justices fear.
The Supreme Court could use videoconferencing without making the video
part of the general broadcast; the Justices and advocates could have access
to video to promote a more dynamic, interactive oral argument, while only
making the audio available to the public. This would retain all of the
advantages of interactive arguments, akin to in-person arguments, without
upsetting those who want to keep the Court's proceedings somewhat under
wraps. While such a format would not provide a dedicated opportunity for
each Justice to speak, it would offer an open forum for any Justice and better
ensure representation of the voices of each of the Justices who choose to
speak. Most importantly, it would protect the Court from the criticism that
the most fundamental role of oral argument-showing the Court to be a
neutral, fair institution-has been undermined. We have shown that criticism
to be fair based on its initial experiment in telephonic oral argument, but this
bias does not need to continue.
One final aspect of the choice to switch to this particular form of oral
argument demands reflection. The Justices of the Supreme Court did not
make this choice, Chief Justice Roberts did-he decided that the Court
would meet by telephone conference, and he decreed that there would not be
a free-ranging conversation, but rather each Justice would speak in order of
seniority, starting with himself. 258 The power to make these decisions rests
not on any constitutional provision but on norms; but if the Trump era has
taught us anything, it is that even cherished norms that were presumed
inviolable can fall by the wayside in the face of partisanship, political
2 9
expediency, and extreme political polarization.

257 Id.

(reporting negotiations on this issue between Chief Justice Rehnquist and Oyez founder Jerry

Goldman, and republishing the fax from the Chief agreeing to make the recordings and transcripts
available each week).
2s8 Biskupic, supra note 6.
259 See, e.g., Tom McCarthy, Donald Trump and the Erosion of Democratic Norms in America,
GUARDIAN (June 2, 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun/02/trump-department-ofjustice-robert-mueller-crisis (reporting interviews with former assistant attorneys general, law professors,
and analysts "from across the political spectrum" describing the undermining of democratic norms and
previously entrenched institutions).

